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INTRODUCTION
Patents are, in theory, a legal right to exclude competitors from 
using the patentee’s invention.  Exactly what the patentee gets to pre-
vent others from using depends, however, on how the law defines the 
scope of the patent right.  In modern American patent doctrine, we 
define what the patentee owns not by what she actually built or dis-
closed, but by what she claimed.  Courts and commentators regularly 
analogize patent claims as akin to the “metes and bounds” of a real 
property deed,1 defining the outer boundaries of a “property” right 
conferred on the patentee.2  According to this view, known as the pe-
ripheral claiming approach, words of a claim form a sort of conceptual 
“fence” that marks the edge of the patentee’s rights.  And for the last 
dozen years, judges have had the responsibility of defining that pe-
riphery, interpreting the perimeter of patent claims in a pretrial pro-
ceeding known as a Markman hearing.3
It isn’t working.  Despite repeated efforts to set out the rules for 
construing patent claims, culminating in the Federal Circuit’s en banc 
Phillips decision in 2005,4 parties and courts seem unable to agree on 
what particular patent claims mean.  Patent law has provided none of 
the certainty associated with the definition of boundaries in real 
property law.  Literally every case involves a fight over the meaning of 
multiple terms, and not just the complex technical ones.  Recent Fed-
eral Circuit cases have had to decide plausible disagreements over the 
meanings of the words “a,”5 “or,”6 “to,”7 “including,”8 and “through,”9
1 See, e.g., CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 
1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (drawing this analogy). 
2 While patents are sometimes referred to as property rights, in fact they are not 
property in the way we traditionally think of land or chattels.  See JAMES BESSEN & MI-
CHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK ch. 2 (2008) (discussing ways in which patents differ from tradi-
tional notions of property); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Rid-
ing, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1036-37 (2005) (listing problems created by treating and 
thinking about patents in the same manner as traditional property).  But cf. Michael A. 
Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004) 
(arguing that real property doctrines can be used by analogy to limit intellectual prop-
erty (IP)). 
3 The procedure is named after Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 
(1996), in which the Supreme Court found that the interpretation of patent claims is a 
matter of law to be decided by the judge. 
4 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
5 See N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
6 See Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
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to name but a few.  Claim construction is sufficiently uncertain that 
many parties don’t settle a case until after the court has construed the 
claims, because there is no baseline for agreement on what the patent 
might possibly cover.  Even after claim construction, the meaning of 
the claims remains uncertain, not only because of the very real pros-
pect of reversal on appeal but also because lawyers immediately begin 
fighting about the meaning of the words used to construe the words 
of the claims. 
The problem is not just lack of understanding.  Rather, claim con-
struction may be inherently indeterminate:  it may simply be impossi-
ble to cleanly map words to things.10  Patent attorneys seize on such 
indeterminacy to excuse infringement or to expand their client’s ex-
clusive rights.  The Federal Circuit reworks patent claims that have al-
ready been construed by district court judges, and the patent system 
increasingly revolves around the definition of terminology rather than 
the substance of what the patentee invented and how significant that 
invention really is.  The key feature of peripheral claiming, setting out 
clear boundaries to warn the public of what is and is not claimed—the 
“notice function” of patents that has received so much attention in re-
cent years11—increasingly seems to be an illusion.12  And it is a dan-
7 See Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cy-
bor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
8 See Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1300-02 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
9 See Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1430-31 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
10 See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?  An Empirical Study of Claim Construc-
tion Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 259 (2008) (“[C]laim con-
struction may be inherently indeterminate.”).  As philosopher Bertrand Russell put it, 
“[e]verything is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it pre-
cise.”  BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM 38 (David Pears ed., 
Open Court 1985).  The Supreme Court recognized the problem in Festo, noting that 
“[u]nfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of 
a thing in a patent application.”  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). 
11 See, e.g., PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“One important purpose of the written description is to provide no-
tice to the public as to the subject matter of the patent, while the claim provides notice 
as to the scope of the invention.”); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1429-30 (discuss-
ing how prosecution history estoppel helps to fulfill the public-notice function of pat-
ents).  Long before the creation of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court itself em-
phasized the notice function, and expressed concern about a “zone of uncertainty 
which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement 
claims.”  United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942). 
12 Jim Bessen and Mike Meurer have colorfully characterized this problem in their 
assertion that “if you can’t tell the boundaries, it ain’t property.”  BESSEN & MEURER,
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gerous illusion, because it means that courts define the scope of legal 
rights not by reference to the invention but by reference to semantic 
debates over the meaning of words chosen by lawyers. 
If patent-claim terms lack the virtue of certainty and are in fact do-
ing mischief in the patent system, perhaps we should begin to rethink 
the whole enterprise of peripheral claiming and the process of claim 
construction that accompanies it. 
There is an alternative.  Before 1870, the scope of U.S. patents was 
determined using a system of “central claiming.”  Under a central-
claiming approach, the patentee does not delineate the outer reach of 
what it claims.  Rather, the patentee discloses the central features of 
the invention—what distinguishes it from the prior art—and the 
courts determine how much protection the patent is entitled to by 
looking at the prior art that cabins the invention, how important the 
patentee’s invention was,13 and how different the accused device is.  In 
some countries elements of that system remain to this day,14 and in-
deed there are vestiges of central claiming in the U.S. patent system.15
supra note 2, at 8.  Although this catch phrase captures a fundamental difference be-
tween patents and real property, as a matter of property theory it is at best incomplete; 
we note the rather large body of legal and economic scholarship discussing the impor-
tant benefits of vagueness in the boundaries of both real and intellectual property.  See,
e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999); Jason 
Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 
(1995); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
93 (2002); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 594 
(1988); Michael Spence & Timothy Endicott, Vagueness in the Scope of Copyright, 121 
L.Q. REV. 657, 661 (2005). 
13 This is the now-moribund doctrine of “pioneer patents,” under which important 
advances received broader protection than more modest improvements.  See, e.g.,
Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 207 (1894) (“If the invention is broad or pri-
mary in its character, the range of equivalents will be correspondingly broad, under 
the liberal construction which the courts give to such inventions.”); Perkin-Elmer 
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A pioneer 
invention is entitled to a broad range of equivalents.”); John R. Thomas, The Question 
Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 37 (1995).  But see
Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (refer-
ring to the pioneer-patents rule as “ancient jurisprudence”), overruled on other grounds by
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
14 See TOSHIKO TAKENAKA, INTERPRETING PATENT CLAIMS: THE UNITED STATES,
GERMANY AND JAPAN (1995) (describing Germany’s “central claiming” system). 
15 For a discussion, see Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1273449.  
Fromer correctly identifies design patents and means-plus-function claims as being 
based in central claiming, although we are less persuaded by her characterization of 
dependent claims and best-mode jurisprudence as elements of central claiming.  In 
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Central claiming is also the norm in U.S. copyright, trademark, and 
trade secret law. 
If the goal of peripheral claiming was to establish fence posts 
marking the boundary of the patent, we can think of central claiming 
as replacing fence posts with sign posts identifying new inventions.16
Whereas peripheral claiming purports to mark the outermost bound-
ary of the patentee’s claims, central claiming describes the core or gist 
of the patentee’s contribution to technology.  In this Article, we argue 
that the way for the patent system to move ahead may be by looking 
behind.  Rather than relying on the illusion of peripheral fence posts, 
patent law may do better to once again look to central sign posts. 
Central claiming would be a radical change, and perhaps the 
country is not ready to take such a step.  Indeed, we are not ourselves 
fully persuaded that the benefits of central claiming outweigh the 
costs.  But it is useful as a thought experiment, bringing our attention 
back to the patentee’s invention rather than words written by lawyers.  
Once we are willing to look beyond a pure peripheral-claiming system, 
there are a number of smaller steps that courts could take to dethrone 
the Markman hearing from its position of honor in patent litigation.  
To begin, not every term in a patent claim needs to be construed or 
fought over.  We might reasonably limit claim construction to the ex-
planation of technical terms that a jury is not likely to understand, re-
storing the original purpose of claim construction.  We might also 
limit claim construction to the point of novelty of the invention, to 
prevent drafting ambiguities on collateral issues from rendering a 
patent worthless.  Second, we could pay more attention to the pat-
entee’s actual description of the invention and less to the words of the 
claims themselves in deciding the patent’s importance and coverage, 
thus avoiding abuse of the litigation process by patentees who invent 
one thing and later claim to own something else entirely.  Third, we 
could reinvigorate the doctrine of pioneer patents, restoring some vi-
tality to the doctrine of equivalents—which Markman killed17—in the 
subset of cases in which the defendant’s product in fact captures the 
principle of the invention.  Finally, we could make peripheral claims 
addition, plant patents employ central claiming.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.163(c)(10) (allowing 
only a single claim on an application for a plant patent). 
16 We borrow this terminology from W. R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 165 (4th ed. 1999). 
17 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 (2007) (“The doctrine of equivalents was alive 
and well before Markman, but has been in decline ever since.”). 
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industry-specific, allowing patentees in industries like chemistry who 
believe they can effectively define a genus to do so, but not limiting pat-
entees in less certain areas to the vagaries of patent-claim language.18
We begin in Part I by examining in some detail the sorry state of 
peripheral claiming, and in particular the failure of patent claims to 
specify the scope of the rights granted to patentees.  The picture we 
paint will be familiar to anyone who is regularly engaged with the 
modern U.S. patent system.  We then review the features of central 
claiming in Part II, including the development of claims themselves, 
tracing the rise and decline of a system that was replaced, ironically, as 
lacking the certainty that peripheral claiming was thought to provide.  
In Part III, we discuss the benefits that might be recaptured by a move 
back toward central claiming as well as the costs of such a move.  We 
also examine several hybrid measures that might be adopted, either in 
the process of moving from fence-posting to sign-posting or as im-
provements over the current system that still stop short of fully adopt-
ing central claiming. 
I. THE BREAKDOWN OF PERIPHERAL CLAIMING
The idea behind peripheral claiming, which U.S. patent law 
adopted in the 1870s, was to establish the “metes and bounds” of the 
invention in a manner analogous to real property deeds.  But any 
analogy between patent boundaries and real property boundaries is 
no more than an analogy, and a flawed analogy at that.19  Those who 
are intimate with the patent system have long understood that it is 
simply impossible to define boundaries of invention with the physical 
or descriptive precision of defining the boundaries of real property.20
18 On the many industry-specific differences between these industries, see, for ex-
ample, DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT (2009).  While one possibility is to make claiming optional, giving the 
option to the patentee rather than to, say, the courts, would solve only one side of the 
problems with claim construction.  A patentee who wanted to claim beyond the 
bounds of the actual invention might choose to rely on peripheral rather than central 
claiming.
19 Indeed, any analogy between real and intellectual property is fraught with peril.  
See Lemley, supra note 2, at 1036-37. 
20 See, e.g., RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS 41 (1949). Henry Smith suggests that 
the definitional problems “are not fundamentally different from those . . . in prop-
erty.”  Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:  Delineating Entitlements in Informa-
tion, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1795-99 (2007).  As we delineate in this Section, that argument 
is simply wrong.  Cf. Michael A. Carrier, Why Modularity Does Not (and Should Not) Ex-
plain Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 95, 97 (2007) 
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Even the boundaries of real property can shift, as when a boundary 
river shifts its course.  But boundaries based upon language lack the 
social durability of surveying data or GPS coordinates—the stable, 
agreed-upon criteria for positioning boundaries in space.21  This com-
bination—semantic “boundaries” coupled with a metaphor that as-
sumes definition and stability—has led to a situation in which the 
metaphorical virtues of peripheral claiming obscure the actual dam-
age it is doing to innovation. 
A.  The Process of Claim Construction 
The peripheral-claiming system seeks to define the outer bounda-
ries of the invention.  In theory, the process works as follows:  The ap-
plicant and the PTO examiner negotiate over the scope of the inven-
tion, limiting it in view of the prior art and the range of examples that 
the applicant has enabled.  The resulting claims define the scope of 
the patent.  Competitors can then read the patent claims and know 
whether their actions will infringe the patent, and therefore whether 
they need to avoid the patent or take a license.  If they decide to in-
fringe, the patentee sues, and courts determine validity and infringe-
ment by comparing those claims to the prior art or the defendant’s 
product, respectively. 
Every stage of this theoretical story depends critically on the ability 
of participants in the process—patentees, examiners, competitors, 
judges, and juries—to understand what the patent claims cover.  Fur-
ther, at several critical points, the story depends on different parties 
(applicant and examiner, patentee and competitor) having a shared
understanding of the meaning of the patent claims.  If the applicant 
and the examiner agree that a patent should issue, but disagree about 
what the patent actually means, something is wrong.  Similarly, if a 
competitor thinks that a patent means one thing and the patentee 
thinks it means something different, they are unlikely to be able to 
conclude a licensing transaction efficiently. 
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/10/10/carrier.html (rejecting Smith’s assertion: 
“boundaries are not as lucid in IP”). 
21 Indeed, ironically, while GPS technology may give us clear boundaries in the 
real world, courts have been unable to agree over the meaning of GPS coordinate sys-
tems in patent law.  Compare Vehicle IP, LLC v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 2008-1259, slip 
op. at 3-7 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 2009), with id. at 1-2 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (disputing the 
meaning of the word “coordinates” in a vehicle navigation system). 
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In fact, disagreements over the meanings of patent claims are 
pandemic.  Lawyers are paid to interpret language—whether in stat-
utes, contracts, or patent claims—in ways that serve their clients’ in-
terests.  And they are, as a general matter, quite good at it.  Before 
1995, disputes over what the patent covered were folded into general 
disputes about patent validity and infringement.  Those disputes ulti-
mately went to the jury, which presumably made an implicit determi-
nation of claim scope in finding the patent valid or not and infringed 
or not.  Judges periodically determined the meaning of patent claims, 
usually in the context of bench trials or summary judgment motions 
requiring resolution of a claim-construction dispute.  But claim con-
struction before 1995 was not a separate inquiry in a patent case.  It 
was a part of the overall determination of either validity or infringe-
ment. 
That changed in 1995 with the Federal Circuit’s Markman deci-
sion, affirmed by the Supreme Court the following year.22  In Mark-
man, the Court held that the construction of patent documents, like 
the construction of other legal documents, was to be done as a matter 
of law by judges, not juries.23  The result was the so-called “Markman
hearing,” a pretrial proceeding in which judges hear argument on the 
meaning of disputed patent claims, sometimes hear evidence, and is-
sue a written ruling defining the words of the claims in other, theo-
retically more precise, words.  Courts are to construe patent claims 
based on some combination of their “plain meaning,” the description 
of the invention in the specification, the prosecution history of the 
patent, technical treatises and dictionaries, expert testimony, and a se-
ries of legal canons of claim interpretation.24  Virtually every judge in 
the country conducts Markman hearings sooner or later in the trial 
process, though a few judges defer claim construction until shortly be-
fore trial when jury instructions are written.25
22 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d 517 
U.S. 370 (1996). 
23 Id. at 388. 
24 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313-24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 
banc); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGI-
CAL AGE 263-68 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) (discussing canons of claim construction). 
25 This is common in the District of Delaware, for instance. 
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B.  Disputes over the Meaning of Patent Claims 
The creation of the Markman hearing has made the process of pe-
ripheral claiming more transparent.  Because judges now hold hear-
ings on claim-construction disputes and have to issue written rulings 
interpreting disputed claims, the nature and extent of those disputes 
is now clearer than it was before 1995.  And the results are quite 
alarming.  First, there is essentially always a dispute over the meaning 
of the patent claims.  Patent suits normally include Markman hearings, 
and every district that has local patent rules provides for them.26  In-
deed, there is rarely just one dispute in a patent claim; patent lawsuits 
frequently involve fights over ten or more claim terms.27  The Federal 
Circuit has held that courts must resolve every dispute over the scope 
of the patent claims as a matter of claim construction, issuing a written 
ruling that “interprets” even simple patent claim terms that jurors can 
understand.28  And district court judges regularly issue orders limiting 
Markman hearings to only ten or so claim terms.  Without demanding 
agreement from the parties, judges might well face arguments over 
the meaning of every word in a patent claim. 
These disputes turn out to be surprisingly hard to resolve.  Even 
after a district court issues its claim-construction order, the meaning 
of the claims is uncertain.  The Federal Circuit reverses more than 
one-third of the claim-construction cases presented to it on appeal, a 
far larger percentage than its general reversal rate.29  These reversals 
aren’t just a problem of lack of education; David Schwartz has found 
that the most experienced district court judges and ITC administrative 
law judges who specialize in patents have their claim-construction de-
26 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PAT. L.R., available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ (follow 
“Rules” hyperlink on left menu; then follow “Patent Local Rules 3/1/2008” hyperlink). 
27 See, e.g., ChriMar Sys., Inc. v. PowerDsine, Ltd., No. 01-74081, 2008 WL 2966470 
(E.D. Mich. July 30, 2008) (construing thirteen terms in one order).  To the extent 
that it is relevant, Professor Lemley serves as the special master in this case. 
28 See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360-62 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
29 The definitive study is Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to 
Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 fig.2, 15 tbl.1 (2001); see also Christian 
A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1075, 1089-90, 1096-1107 (2001) (finding a reversal rate between 29% and 
38%, depending on the period examined).  More recent work by Judge Moore sug-
gests that the reversal rate is increasing, not decreasing, over time.  Kimberly A. Moore, 
Markman Eight Years Later:  Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 231, 246 fig. (2005) (finding a reversal rate of around forty percent); cf. Schwartz, 
supra note 10, at 267-68 (finding data consistent with Judge Moore’s in a study directed 
at learning effects among district judges). 
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cisions reversed just as often as district judges without patent experi-
ence.30  And despite agreement by the Federal Circuit in Phillips on 
the criteria for interpreting patent claims, Federal Circuit judges can-
not agree on how to apply those criteria:  the rate of dissents in claim-
construction appeals tripled after Phillips was decided,31 and the over-
all reversal rate remained high.32  In short, claim-construction disputes 
aren’t just make-work; they seem harder for courts to resolve consis-
tently than other types of patent disputes. 
Why are there so many disputes over the meaning of patent-claim 
terms?  One possibility is that patents cover new scientific terminology 
that doesn’t have a fixed meaning in the art, so that scientists in the 
field can reasonably disagree over the meaning of those terms.  No 
doubt this does happen from time to time.  But it is by no means a full 
or even primary explanation for claim-construction disputes.  At least 
four more structural problems make certainty in patent boundary-
drawing unlikely. 
First, lawyers are paid to create, identify, and exploit ambiguities 
in language.33  And lawyers are good at their jobs.  The problem be-
gins with the patent applicant.  Many claim-construction disputes are 
over the meaning of terms that are well understood in the art, but 
which are insufficiently specified in the claim itself.  Biotechnologists 
understand what a “monoclonal antibody” is, but, depending on con-
text, the universe of things that they would include in that term may 
range from the narrow (only IgM mouse-derived antibodies, say) to 
the broad (any antibody, including chimeric and humanized antibod-
30 See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization:  An Empirical Study of Claim Con-
struction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade 
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 30, on file with 
authors) (suggesting that the reason experienced judges can’t get claim construction 
right may be “that claim construction is indeterminate”); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 
267-68. 
31 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?  Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence 24 (Mar. 30, 2008); see also
R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?  An Empirical As-
sessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111-13 (2004) (suggesting that 
agreement on the interpretive tools of claim construction masks methodological dif-
ferences in the act of interpretation). 
32 See Michael Saunders, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 215, 236 (2007) (finding a claim-construction reversal rate of 39.5% af-
ter Phillips).  Notably, Saunders’s study excludes Rule 36 affirmances, and so should 
bias the reversal rate upwards. 
33 Cf. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (noting the “highly developed” 
art of writing patents that actually disclose very little). 
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ies).34  The applicant has the power to define the patent claims, but 
many applicants don’t specify what they mean by ambiguous technical 
language, either because they don’t think about the issue or because 
they intend to exploit the ambiguity in obtaining or enforcing the 
patent. 
Even if the patentee is not being deliberately ambiguous, a dozen 
years of Markman hearings have made it clear beyond doubt that liti-
gators can and will find ambiguity in claim language.  Some argu-
ments over the meaning of claims may be frivolous, but it is surprising 
how many disputes present legitimate questions of context.  This is 
true not only of technical terms—what does “monoclonal antibody” 
cover—but simple terms as well.  Everyone knows what the word “a” 
means—but does it mean “one and only one,” or “one or more?”35
Depending on the context, either is plausible.  And Federal Circuit 
decisions have given the same term different meanings in different 
cases.  Similarly, A “or” B can mean either “any of A, B, A + B” or36 “any 
of A, B, but not A + B.”37  Lawyers regularly fight over the meaning of 
many terms in each patent claim, and those fights are often surpris-
ingly hard to resolve merely on the “plain meaning” of the language.  
Language, it turns out, doesn’t have “a” plain meaning—unless of 
course, “a” means “one or more.”38
The problem is sometimes complicated by the very legal rules that 
courts have created to help us resolve those ambiguities.  Some of 
those rules—such as the rule that courts can look to the specification 
to understand the meaning of claim terms but not to read in addi-
tional limitations39—make sense as a matter of theory.  In practice, 
however, the line is difficult to draw, and the fact that courts draw it 
leads lawyers to interpret terms creatively in order to warrant resorting 
to the specification.  Similarly, the doctrine of claim differentiation, 
which provides that different claims should be interpreted to cover 
different things, makes sense in theory.  In practice, however, lawyers 
34 See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (discussing the scope of possible definitions for “monoclonal antibodies”). 
35 Compare the meaning of “a” in the expressions “I want a job” and “I want a 
birthday present.” 
36 Forgive the expression. 
37 Compare the meaning of “or” in the expressions “I will vote for Obama or 
McCain” and “it will rain or snow today.” 
38 See, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 296 (1990) 
(“[M]eaning does not reside simply in the words of a text, for the words are always 
pointing to something outside.”). 
39 See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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who are aware of the doctrine sometimes pick different words that 
mean the same thing, relying on the doctrine of claim differentiation 
to force courts to give those terms different meanings.40
The legal rule that most complicates the process is the Federal 
Circuit’s recent decision that every dispute over patent scope must be 
resolved as a matter of claim construction.  In O2 Micro, the Federal 
Circuit confronted a simple English word with an established mean-
ing, but the parties disagreed as to whether it applied to the defen-
dant’s product.  The court held that whenever there is a dispute over 
what a claim covers, the ambiguity must be resolved as a matter of 
claim construction because it represents an uncertainty in the mean-
ing of patent claims.41  After O2 Micro, courts have no power to limit 
the scope of claim construction by passing the dispute to the jury, no 
matter how unambiguous the language of the claim might seem.42
The problem is more structural than just the ability of lawyers to 
exploit the ambiguity of language, however.  A second fundamental 
problem with certainty in claim construction is the ambiguity of audi-
ence.  Put briefly, the issue is this:  are patent claims to be interpreted 
as they would be understood by the patentee or by the person having 
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA)?  Patent law points in inconsistent 
directions on this question.  On the one hand, much of patent doc-
trine is directed to determining what the PHOSITA would under-
stand—about the claimed invention, about the prior art, about the 
teachings of the specification.43  In claim construction, the focus on 
“plain meaning” and the occasional resort to dictionaries or treatises44
40 See Mark A. Lemley, The Limits of Claim Differentiation, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1389, 1394-95 (2007). 
41 O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360-62 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
42 But cf. IP Cleaning S.p.A. v. Annovi Reverberi, S.p.A., No. 08-0147, slip op. at 2-3 
(W.D. Wis. Dec. 3, 2008) (requiring evidence that the claim dispute is relevant to valid-
ity or infringement, in order to avoid issuing an advisory opinion). 
43 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007) (emphasizing 
the abilities of the PHOSITA in obviousness); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Ne-
mours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting the importance of the 
PHOSITA in enablement); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Tech-
nology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1185-96 (2002) (discussing the role that 
the PHOSITA plays in various patent doctrines). 
44 See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“[D]ictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist 
the court in [claim construction].”).  Texas Digital was substantially limited in this re-
spect by Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).  The use of 
dictionaries or other “plain meaning” raises significant problems of hermeneutics; 
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suggest that it is the reader whose understanding of the claim matters.  
On the other hand, various aspects of claim construction, such as the 
rule that the patentee is free to define her own claim terms,45 the fo-
cus on examples disclosed and particularly on the language chosen in 
the specification,46 and the occasional reliance on prosecution history 
as evidence of the meaning of patent claims,47 seem to suggest that the 
goal of claim construction is to discern what the patentee intended 
the invention to cover.  And some claim-construction rules do not fo-
cus on either the inventor or the PHOSITA, but rather ask what a pat-
ent lawyer would understand the claims to mean.  How else to under-
stand, for instance, the distinction that the courts draw between 
“comprising” and “consisting of”?48  The fiction that claim construc-
tion is a question of legal interpretation for judges, not an exercise in 
understanding technology that depends on the facts,49 is part and par-
there is no guarantee that the dictionary or common definition of a term necessarily 
reflects the intent of the inventor, let alone what the inventor conceived. 
45 See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
46 See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.  Indeed, patentees who cite only a single ex-
ample or examples that all fit into one category in a specification may find that their 
claims are limited to that category.  See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, 
Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1336-38 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
47 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317; Astrazeneca AB, Inc. v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 384 
F.3d 1333, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
48 “Comprising” means that the patented invention contains at least the elements 
listed, but may also contain others; “consisting of” means that the invention contains 
only those elements listed.  See, e.g., KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 There are other examples of claim construction based on a lawyer’s understand-
ing.  For instance, the Federal Circuit’s definition of “a” owes more to the rule of pat-
ent law that a claim that uses the term “comprising” is open (and so is infringed by any 
product that includes the patented elements even if it also includes other things not 
listed in the patent) than it does to any PHOSITA’s understanding of the term “a” in 
context.  See id.; Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(“[O]ur cases emphasize that ‘a’ or ‘an’ can mean ‘one’ or ‘more than one,’ depend-
ing on the context in which the article is used.”).  Judicial interpretation of weasel-
word claim terms such as “about” also seem to owe more to a legal interest in defining 
claim scope than the way in which any particular PHOSITA would understand those 
words.  See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1369-72 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (holding that the term “about” should “be given its ordinary meaning of 
‘approximately’”); BJ Servs. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 338 F.3d 1368, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (agreeing that a jury should be instructed to give “about” its plain and 
ordinary meaning). 
49 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
banc) (holding that claim construction is an issue of law for judges to decide).  For 
strident criticism of that rule, see Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330-35 (Mayer, J., dissenting), 
which notes that “[w]hile this court may persist in the delusion that claim construction 
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cel of the problem.  The courts have not grappled adequately with the 
question of who is to understand the claim terms.  It should not be 
surprising that we will have difficulty in defining terms clearly if we 
don’t know whose understanding of the claims matters, particularly 
since the person doing the defining is neither inventor nor PHOSITA 
nor even patent lawyer. 
Third, even if we know the audience for claim terms, we have no 
coherent standards for deciding into what chunks claim language 
should be broken.  To infringe, a defendant’s product must include 
each and every “element” of the patented claim.50  As we have ex-
plained elsewhere, the scope of a patent will often depend on whether 
an “element” is a single word in the claim, a phrase in the claim, or a 
fifty-word chunk of the claim: 
Determining the meaning of patent claims necessarily requires a judge 
to break the text of a claim into discrete “elements” or units of text cor-
responding to the elements or units that comprise the claimed inven-
tion, essentially organizing the language of the claims into “chunks” or 
“quanta” of text.  Define an element narrowly—limit it to a single word, 
say—and you will tend to narrow the resulting patent.  By contrast, defin-
ing an element broadly tends to broaden the patent. 
 For each discrete packet identified, the courts must determine the 
meaning of the constituent words.  They can assign those words defini-
tions that range from narrow, specific meanings to broad, general mean-
ings.  In determining the meaning of terms within a particular element, 
judges practicing patent claim interpretation are engaged in an exercise 
that to some degree resembles the famous “levels of abstraction test” ar-
ticulated by Judge Learned Hand for analysis of infringement under 
copyright law’s “idea/expression” doctrine. 
 There are no hard and fast standards in the law by which to make the 
“right” decision as to either the size of the textual element or the level of 
abstraction at which it will be evaluated.  Indeed, the indeterminacy is so 
acute that courts generally don’t even acknowledge that they are engag-
ing in either inquiry.  They define an element almost arbitrarily, and 
even when judges disagree as to the proper definition they offer no 
principled basis for doing so.
51
is a purely legal determination, unaffected by underlying facts, it is plainly not the 
case.”  That issue may still be revisited by the Federal Circuit en banc.  See Amgen Inc. 
v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., 
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc). 
50 See, e.g., Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
51 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 29, 29-30 (2005) (italics omitted). 
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Fourth, even if we could overcome all of these problems, any ef-
fort to define a claim term necessarily requires that we fix the mean-
ing of that term in time.  Words change in meaning, sometimes slowly 
as language evolves, but sometimes with surprising rapidity.52  (If you 
don’t believe us, ping someone from two decades ago and ask them to 
Google the question of language evolution and forward the results to 
you.)  Change in the meaning of language is particularly likely in the 
case of innovation, since the terms in question are often new and the 
concepts they represent are not yet fully understood.  In Chiron Corp. 
v. Genentech, Inc., for instance, the court faced the issue of whether 
“monoclonal antibody” should be given its 1984 meaning or its very 
different 1999 meaning.53  And, in SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter-
prises, Inc., the court had to decide whether the claim phrase “regu-
larly received television signal,” written in 1985, covered digital televi-
sion signals that did not exist at that time but were common by the 
time of infringement.54
The problem is that patent law asks different questions as of dif-
ferent times.  It tests novelty and nonobviousness at the time that the 
invention was made, enablement and written description as of the fil-
ing date, the meaning of means-plus-function patent claims as of the 
date the patent issues, and infringement as of the date of infringe-
ment.55  The knowledge of those of skill in the art evolves between 
those dates, which can be separated by decades.  That means that, 
strictly speaking, patent law shouldn’t be giving claim terms one mean-
ing, but different meanings for different purposes.  This is an issue 
that has been almost entirely ignored in claim construction.56  It fur-
ther undermines the idea that a “fence post” system of peripheral 
claiming can create certainty by defining the scope of the invention in 
a static way.  It can’t, at least not without modifying many of the fun-
damental precepts of patent law.57
52 See, e.g., Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 116, 147-48 
(1863) (resolving a dispute over whether the term “bridge” as used in a 1790 statute  
encompassed railroad bridges not contemplated at the time of enactment). 
53 363 F.3d 1247, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  For detailed discussion of this issue, see 
Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 105, 
117 (2005). 
54 358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605-06 
(C.C.P.A. 1977). 
55 See Lemley, supra note 53, at 105-10 (citing cases). 
56 See id. at 116. 
57 In an article on this issue, one of us took the position that peripheral-claim con-
struction required collapsing these date dichotomies.  Id. at 117-25.  While that is true, 
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Fifth, a significant puzzle of modern claim construction is the 
asymmetrical treatment of patent claims and prior art references.  Pat-
ent courts have developed elaborate rules for construing patent claims, 
including a variety of canons of construction and hierarchies for reli-
ance upon supporting documents such as prosecution histories and 
dictionaries.58  But patent law includes no such rules for interpreting 
the prior art against which claims are measured, despite the fact that 
references surely do not interpret themselves and must be parsed under 
some set of expectations, even if those expectations go unarticulated.59
In some instances, there may be no explicit interpretive schema 
for prior art references because the references are not documents.  
We have observed elsewhere that patent infringement analysis re-
quires the interpreter to map textual claims onto objects or processes 
in the real world.60  The Federal Circuit has spoken of literal in-
fringement occurring when the accused device reads “word-for-word” 
on the patent claim,61 but the words are all on one side of that com-
parison; there are no words in the accused device to map onto the 
words of the claim.  Certainly physical objects and processes must be 
“interpreted” at some level; the mind has some neurological and intel-
lectual heuristic for perceiving objects in a meaningful way and com-
paring those perceptions to the claim text.  But law remains a largely 
textual enterprise, and there are (as yet) no explicit legal canons for 
constructing the meanings of objects.62  Those interpretive processes 
remain implicit and opaque. 
the fact that peripheral claiming requires that modification, and the fact that courts 
have not yet grappled with that issue demonstrates some of the uncertainty inherent in 
peripheral claiming. 
58 See supra Section I.B. 
59 It is true that we care about prior-art references for different reasons than we 
care about patent claims.  We read a prior-art reference for everything that it teaches, 
while we limit patent claims to what the inventor actually possessed at the time of in-
vention.  But the fact that we should construe prior-art references differently than we 
do claims for some purposes doesn’t explain why we don’t seem to construe them at 
all.
60 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 51, at 36.  This naturally also occurs in some 
other areas of law, such as determining whether a contractual provision is satisfied by 
the goods delivered.  See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. 
Supp. 116, 118-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (parsing the meaning of the word “chicken”). 
61 See, e.g., Sri Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
62 See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 533 
(1992) (“The format of the printed text enframes the process of creating and identify-
ing the legal reality . . . .”). 
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At the same time, not all claim construction occurs in the context 
of infringement.  Claims are also construed in the context of invalid-
ity, against the prior art.  Some prior art references do constitute ac-
tual devices or practices, such as anticipatory prior art known or used 
in the United States before the date of invention.63  But most refer-
ences will be textual, and even those that are not textual must typically 
be reduced to a text before they can be evaluated by a court.64  For 
that matter, even infringement analysis can require evaluation of tex-
tual prior art—for example, to determine whether a range of equiva-
lents is precluded by the prior art or by foreseeable technologies.65
Thus, patent law frequently requires the mapping of text onto 
text, construing claims against the prior art references.  Courts ask 
whether every element in a patent claim is found in an anticipatory 
reference but have no explicit method for determining how to parse 
the prior-art text to determine the presence of the invention’s ele-
ments.  Indeed, under the statutory-bar provisions of section 102(b), 
the standard is one of substantial similarity—a classic statement of 
central-claiming analysis.66  Where obviousness is concerned, courts 
measure the claimed invention against the knowledge of the person 
having ordinary skill in the art—the PHOSITA.67  The PHOSITA is in 
some sense a composite of relevant prior-art references as of the date 
of invention.  But again, there are no explicit interpretive rules to de-
termine how such prior art is to be read, either individually or in the 
aggregate.  The result is that while we construe patent claims, theo-
retically providing certainty in meaning, we proceed to undermine 
that certainty in the subset of cases that involve comparing those 
claims not to devices but to other, unconstrued documents. 
63 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
64 See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1009, 1031 (2008). 
65 See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 
683-85 (Fed. Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Mor-
ton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
66 See, e.g., Dix-Seal Corp. v. New Haven Trap Rock Co., 236 F. Supp. 914, 919 
(D. Conn. 1964); see also In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (holding that 
there need not be precise identity between the claimed invention and 102(b) prior-art 
reference).  To be sure, this seems to be an effort to ensure that section 102(b) prior 
art fits within the obviousness framework despite the literal language of section 103, 
which refers to obviousness “at the time the invention was made,” not after that time.  
35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
67 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
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Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, is the problem of what 
we might call metaconstruction.  Peripheral claiming presumes that 
the claims set out boundaries.  The process of claim construction itself 
presumes that the words of the claims are insufficiently precise to de-
lineate those boundaries.  The solution that claim construction offers 
is to substitute theoretically clearer words for the unclear words of the 
patent claim.  But what happens when—as seems inevitable—the par-
ties dispute the meaning of those new words?  We should be skeptical 
that the substitution of litigation-driven claim constructions for 
equally well-understood terms that were not written with particular 
litigation in mind will advance the understanding or clarity of patent 
scope.  It may end up resolving particular cases—indeed, it normally 
will, at least if the lawyers advocating those claim constructions are 
good at their jobs—but there is no reason to think these other words 
will be less ambiguous or more likely to help a jury. 
How great these problems are depends, to a large extent, on the 
industry in which the patent exists.  A patent claim that covers a DNA 
sequence—a list of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs—is perfectly clear to a biotech-
nologist.  Similarly, a chemical formula is perfectly clear to a chemist.68
By contrast, we have a much harder time defining machines in words, 
and a still harder time writing words that clearly delineate the scope of 
software inventions.69  Not surprisingly, therefore, disputed claim con-
structions are more likely in the latter sorts of industries.  Similarly, 
David Schwartz has found significant differences in the claim-
construction reversal rates in different industries,70 suggesting that 
resolution of those disputes is also harder in some industries than it is 
in others.  Our point is not that no one can ever understand patent 
claims.  Rather, it is that, in the industries that account for the over-
whelming majority of patents,71 figuring out the boundaries of a pe-
ripheral claim is difficult, if not impossible.  And it is certainly not 
something on which the relevant audiences—patentees, examiners, 
competitors, and judges—can often agree. 
68 An exception involves “weasel words”—terms like “about” or “substantially” that 
vary the scope of a genus. 
69 This is just one of the many industry-specific characteristics of the patent system.  
For a broader discussion, see BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 18. 
70 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 260-61. 
71 In this decade, organic chemistry and biotechnology patents account for only 
four percent of applications filed.  Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Essay, Is the Pat-
ent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 195 tbl.7 (2008). 
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The problem is compounded by a drift in the use of patent claim 
construction.  Before Markman, even in what was nominally a periph-
eral claiming system, the focus was on arguing infringement and valid-
ity to the jury.  Claim construction occurred, if at all, primarily in the 
context of explaining the meaning of patent terms to the jury.  As a 
result, it was more likely to be focused on how the PHOSITA would 
understand technical terms, not on legal argument over the impact of 
nontechnical terms.72  Once Markman removed the process from the 
jury,73 and particularly once the Federal Circuit made it clear that all 
disputes over patent scope must be resolved in the claim-construction 
process,74 that focus was lost.  The result was to expand the domain of 
the uncertainties that we have discussed in this Section, worsening the 
perils of claim construction by adding to their reach. 
C. The Costs of Claim Construction
If our only point were that claim construction is difficult, and that 
courts are unlikely to get it right in all cases, the reader might fairly 
respond that life (and litigation) is uncertain, and that the inability to 
make decisions perfectly is no reason not to make them at all.  Law re-
lies on language, and interpreting language—the language of con-
tracts, the language of statutes, the language of constitutions—is what 
courts do.  Why would we expect the interpretation of patent claims to 
be any different? 
But the interpretation of patent claims, we think, is different:  
first, because of the custom of peripheral claiming; second, because of 
the procedural and substantive peculiarity of the Markman hearing; 
and third, because of the relationship between the process of claim 
construction and the particular goals of the patent system.  Constru-
ing claims is not like interpreting a contract or a statute:  the focus on 
claim construction that peripheral claiming, and Markman in particu-
lar, brings to the interpretive exercise imposes significant and peculiar 
costs on patentees, defendants, and innovation as a whole. 
First, and most obviously, the claim-construction process raises the 
cost of litigation.  Markman hearings themselves are expensive, requir-
72 According to a February 12, 2009, Westlaw search, the Federal Circuit has re-
ferred to “claim construction” 1407 times in its twenty-seven-year history.  Of those ref-
erences, 141 occurred before 1995 and 1266 occurred in 1995 or later. 
73 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
74 See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360-62 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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ing legal briefing, argument, and often witnesses and discovery.  But 
their litigation costs are not just direct.  Parties often wait until after a 
Markman ruling to settle a case because they don’t have a clear sense 
of the scope of their patent until the district court defines the patent 
claims.  As a result, districts that do not hold Markman hearings, or 
that issue their rulings very late in the process, tend to have more pat-
ent trials and later settlements.75  And the prospect of appellate rever-
sal may keep the parties litigating even after the Markman ruling. 
The litigation cost associated with claim construction is the least 
significant problem that Markman causes.  Far more significant is that 
legal interpretation of words has taken the place of a definition of the 
proper scope of the invention itself.  Markman sidetracks us into bat-
tles over the meaning of words that were used in the first instance to 
try to define the invention, and then (in metaconstruction) into bat-
tles over the meaning of other words defining the words that were 
supposed to define the invention in the first place.  It should be no 
surprise that the result of this collateral process bears only a coinci-
dental relationship to the ideal scope of the patent claim.  After 
Markman, we’re not often litigating what the inventor did or what her 
patent should cover, because we are too concerned with what the law-
yers did to define what the invention should cover.  We have, in other 
words, taken our eyes off of the ball. 
The shift in focus from the invention to the claim language allows 
both sides to game the process.  It permits—and indeed even encour-
ages—overclaiming by patentees, particularly patentees drafting or in-
terpreting claims years after the invention itself.  If the focus is on the 
language of my claims, not the product that I actually built or de-
scribed, I can interpret that language creatively to claim, in retrospect, 
to own inventions that I didn’t have in mind when I wrote the patent 
claims.  In case after case, patentees claim to have invented electronic 
commerce, or multimedia, or video-on-demand, voice-over-Internet, 
or call centers, or any of a hundred other successful technologies.  If 
the patent lawsuit were focused on the central features of what the 
patentee invented, overclaiming wouldn’t work.  But if the focus is on 
the words of the patent claims, then patent drafters can deliberately 
introduce ambiguity and patent litigators can exploit both deliberate 
and accidental ambiguities.  Overclaiming may or may not help the 
75 See Mark A. Lemley & Josh Walker, Does Markman Drive Settlements?  Trial 
Rates in Patent Cases Across Districts (vaporware 2009). 
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patentee; the risk is that a claim that is too broad will be held invalid.76
But the threat that the patent will be broadly construed will often be 
enough to prompt a settlement. 
The inherent ambiguity of claim construction does not always 
benefit patentees.  Individual ambiguities can just as easily be inter-
preted against the patentee as for her.  In fact, the collective effect of 
claim construction may systematically work to disadvantage patentees.  
A clever defendant will interpret individual claim terms in ways that 
render the claim either invalid or not infringed.  If a defendant makes 
ten such claim-construction arguments, the patentee may have to win 
every one in order for the claim to survive.  So the more terms a court 
construes, the more bites at the apple defendants get.77  And because 
claim drafting is, as we have seen, inherently imprecise, any one mis-
take can be fatal. 
The doctrine of equivalents exists to correct just this sort of error 
in claim drafting, permitting the patentee to expand the scope of her 
claim to cover a defendant’s product that differs from the patented 
invention in only a minor respect.78  But that leads us to a final prob-
lem with peripheral claiming:  it has effectively spelled the end of the 
doctrine of equivalents.  The operation of the doctrine of equivalents 
is effectively a form of central claiming; taking the literal claim con-
struction as the central invention, the doctrine then asks whether the 
accused device appropriates the “gist” of the literal claims by adopting 
a substitution known in the art, or uses an alternative element that ac-
complishes the same function in the same way to achieve the same re-
sult.  But it is harder to apply this doctrine to a nominally peripheral 
claim because we are no longer focused on the heart of the invention.  
Courts are aware that the text of the claims is supposed to represent 
the outermost boundaries of the inventor’s rights, and they are anx-
ious not to expand the claims through the doctrine of equivalents.  
This tension between peripheral claiming and the doctrine of equiva-
lents leads, first, to impossible, almost mystical, judicial pronounce-
76 In Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 908 (Fed. Cir. 2004), for in-
stance, the Federal Circuit accepted the patentee’s claim-construction argument that 
its claims were not limited to the invention disclosed in the specification.  But on re-
mand, the district court held the broadened claims invalid, No. 98-0858 2005 WL 
2840744 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 2005), and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the 
claims were not enabled when construed that broadly.  Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. 
Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
77 To be fair, the patentee has multiple bites at the apple too, since she files mul-
tiple claims in each patent and often obtains a family of patents. 
78 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950). 
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ments about the doctrine of equivalents.  For example, the Federal 
Circuit has held that the doctrine of equivalents does not expand the 
scope of the claims, only the inventor’s right to exclude, and gives the 
inventor no more than she would have had under a properly drafted 
literal claim.79  Second, this tension leads to expansion of the patent 
claims under the rubric of literal interpretation; rather than finding 
infringement by equivalents, interpretive sleight of hand is used to 
stretch the claims text to cover similar accused devices. 
As a result, peripheral claiming has eroded the doctrine of equiva-
lents to the point where it is no longer a significant part of patent law.  
John Allison and Mark Lemley found that patent plaintiffs almost 
never win doctrine of equivalents cases after Markman.80  They trace 
the death of the doctrine to Markman itself, because district courts 
that construe claims and then decide literal infringement on summary 
judgment are unwilling to undo the work of claim construction by al-
lowing the patentee to argue the doctrine of equivalents.81  The result 
is that Markman has not only set traps for patentees with ambiguous 
claims, but it has effectively eliminated the best way of avoiding those 
traps.
Peripheral claiming has created another, less appreciated, prob-
lem on the validity side.  It is axiomatic that to be valid, a patent must 
“enable”—teach one of skill in the art to make and use—the “full 
scope” of the claimed invention.82  But as Jeff Lefstin has pointed out, 
it is effectively impossible to enable the full scope of a peripheral 
claim, because in a peripheral claiming system even the simplest claim 
contains infinite possible embodiments, only some of which can be 
conceived, much less taught.83  For a long while, patent courts ignored 
this paradox, sometimes by assuming that in a predictable art the 
79 See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (“To say that the doctrine of equivalents extends or enlarges the 
claims is a contradiction in terms.  The claims . . . remain the same and application of 
the doctrine expands the right to exclude to ‘equivalents’ of what is claimed.” (italics 
omitted)), overruled in part on other grounds by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 
508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
80 Allison & Lemley, supra note 17, at 966-67 (“[P]atentees won only 24% of the 
doctrine of equivalents cases decided [from 1999 to 2007].”). 
81 See id. at 978 (finding that patentees won 40% of doctrine-of-equivalents cases 
prior to Markman)
82 See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts:  Fully Scoping 
the New Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/ 
pdf/chao-rethinking-enablement.pdf. 
83 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141 (2009). 
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PHOSITA could figure out what all the embodiments were,84 and 
sometimes by circularity of reasoning: a patentee only need enable 
embodiments understood at the time of invention.85  More recently, 
however, the Federal Circuit has been taking seriously the idea that a 
peripheral claim must actually enable everything within the periph-
ery.86  And since, as Lefstin has observed, that is effectively impossible, 
the result is a parade of nonobvious inventions whose patents are 
nonetheless invalidated on enablement grounds. 
In short, the effect of peripheral claiming is not to provide cer-
tainty over the meaning of patent claims but to replace debates over 
the proper scope of a legal right with debates over the meaning of 
terms that often bear only a tenuous relationship to the invention that 
is the basis of that right.87  The focus on the meaning of individual 
words in patent claims drafted by patent lawyers has displaced a focus 
on what the patentee actually invented and how significant that inven-
tion is.  The result is that, in modern patent litigation, patent scope—
the key policy lever courts can use to ensure that patents encourage 
innovation—depends not on what the patentee invented but on what 
terms the patent prosecutor chose to use and how clever patent litiga-
tors are in twisting the meaning of those terms.  That is not a recipe 
for socially optimizing patent scope.  And the cost of getting the scope 
decision wrong is high-–invalidation of a patent deemed overbroad, or 
holdup caused by patents that are too broad. 
II. CENTRAL CLAIMING
We have described a set of factors, endemic to the peripheral 
claiming system, that converge to produce perverse results; the pat-
ents construed in Markman hearings are defined in ways that are both 
over- and underinclusive.  Patent claims can be written or interpreted 
to cover things far removed from what the patentee actually built or 
84 Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1987); At-
las Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
85 In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605-06 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
86 See, e.g., Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Automotive 
Techs. Int’l v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Liebel-Flarsheim 
Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
87 Cf. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“An 
invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings.  A ver-
bal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent 
law.  This conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which can-
not be satisfactorily filled.”). 
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designed, and much abuse of the patent system results from this sort 
of opportunistic overclaiming.  At the same time, the fact that patents 
are defined by their claims gives defendants an opportunity to seize 
on a drafting ambiguity in order to escape infringement in cases 
where the defendant’s actions should be well within the scope of the 
patentee’s invention.  And the fact that claim construction has effec-
tively replaced patent law’s doctrine of equivalents88 means that a sin-
gle mistake in drafting or interpreting a patent claim can effectively 
doom a patent. 
The dysfunctional state of patent scope is not happenstance, or at 
least it is not mere happenstance.  It is rather the product of judicial 
and policy decisions that were made as far back as the 1870s, when pe-
ripheral claiming, and claims themselves, became ensconced in the 
U.S. patent system.  To fully understand how we have reached the cur-
rent situation, we must look back at the development of claims and 
claim interpretation, following history from fence posts back to sign 
posts.  Tracing peripheral claiming to its roots leads very quickly to a 
consideration of central claiming—the predecessor from which pe-
ripheral claiming developed, and which in many countries continued 
as an alternative to peripheral claiming well into the late twentieth 
century.  In fact, many vestiges of central claiming remain in the 
modern U.S. patent system, which has never entirely expurgated its 
central claiming origins.  In the end, we will find that the develop-
ment of peripheral claiming presents a familiar story that illuminates 
the current difficulties with claim construction and perhaps shows a 
way out of those difficulties. 
A.  From Sign Posts to Fence Posts 
Both claims themselves and the interpretation of claims as pe-
ripheral markers to the patent rights developed over time as a matter 
of custom and common law.89  As a textual form, separate claims 
evolved over a period of decades, largely as a matter of informal con-
vention in response to judicial preferences.90  The earliest versions of 
the U.S. Patent Act required only that an applicant supply what we 
would now call a specification to disclose the invention that was the 
88  Allison & Lemley, supra note 17, at 978-79. 
89 See William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 
MICH. L. REV. 755,757-58 (1948). 
90 Id. at 758. 
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subject of the patent.91  Patents from this period contained no sepa-
rate statements constituting claims, and courts determined both inva-
lidity and infringement on the basis of the disclosure. 
However, in cases involving combinations of old and new ele-
ments, some courts viewed the overall description of the invention as 
an invalid, overreaching attempt to claim those elements already in 
the prior art.  These opinions created an incentive for patent drafters 
to somehow clarify which aspects of the invention were novel, and so 
the proper subject of the patent.  Consequently, patent drafters began 
to break out of the text a distinct, separate statement of the novel fea-
tures of the invention as a one sentence “claim,” in order to avoid the 
possibility that the patent might be viewed as intended to claim every-
thing in the full description of the invention.92  Alternatively, some 
patents would contain a distinct, separate statement disclaiming the 
old, unpatentable features of the invention that might be contained in 
the full description.93
Initially such “claims” were considered useful, and perhaps desir-
able to clarify the description of the invention, but optional.  Patents 
were held valid with claims and without claims; claims were simply a 
format available when the inventor felt the need to specially denote 
particular features of the invention.  Neither were the claims read as a 
separate statement of the invention; they were read as part of the 
overall description, together with the main body of text and drawings 
in the patent, to assist in determining what features of the invention 
were the subject of the patent.  Only over a long period of time did 
the addition of claims to the document move from an optional fea-
ture, to an expected feature, to a feature required by convention, and 
ultimately to a feature mandated in formal Patent Office rules.94
The use of claims as a mechanism to define the peripheral 
boundaries of the patentee’s rights was similarly incremental, evolving 
over a period of decades after claims appeared as a distinct textual 
component of the patent document.  Interpretation of claims as an 
outer boundary did not begin as a separate doctrine but appears to 
91 U.S. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109. 
92 See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents (pt. 1), 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
134, 139-41 (1938) [hereinafter Lutz, Evolution ]. 
93 Presumably, had history proceeded a bit differently, instead of claims we might 
now have “disclaims” at the end of every patent, see id. at 141, as indeed we now do in 
trademark law. 
94 See id. at 142-43 (tracing the development of the Act of 1836); see also ELLIS, su-
pra note 20, at 2-4 (analyzing the claim requirement). 
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have been a continuation of “strict construction” approaches to the 
patent text that predated the appearance of separate claims.95  Some 
courts treated the patent, with or without claims, as limited to that 
which was explicitly described within the four corners of the docu-
ment.  Other courts held that the patent right was not limited to the 
specific embodiment disclosed in the patent but encompassed other 
embodiments or “equivalents” of the disclosed invention.96  As claims 
began to appear as a separate feature of the patent, they became the 
focus of this interpretive sparring.  As “strict construction” of the 
claims gained the upper hand in judicial interpretation, literal inter-
pretation of the claims became regarded as the definitive statement of 
what the patent covered, and inventors naturally responded by draft-
ing claims as broadly as possible, to encompass as much technological 
space as possible. 
The development of peripheral claiming out of judicial strict con-
structionist approaches was closely related to judicial debates over the 
claiming of “principles” in patents.  Although courts that strictly con-
strued the text of patents limited the coverage of a patent to that ex-
plicitly described in the document, courts holding that the embodi-
ments in the disclosure were representative of the invention typically 
extended coverage of the patent to “substantially similar” embodi-
ments.  Substantially similar embodiments were sometimes said to be 
those encompassing the “same principle” as that disclosed.  However, 
the same courts rejected overly broad applications of this doctrine, 
prohibiting extensions of a patent to either general “principles” of 
science or to every possible embodiment of the patented invention’s 
“principle.” 
The best known examples of this tension appear in the famous 
cases O’Reilly v. Morse97 and The Telephone Cases.98  In the former, the 
Supreme Court rejected Samuel Morse’s claim to all forms of com-
munication via electromagnetic transmission as an illegitimate at-
tempt to cover all applications of his telegraphic invention;99 in the lat-
ter case, the court approved Bell’s claim to all types of telephonic 
apparatus.100  To some extent these holdings persist in modern doc-
95 See Lutz, Evolution (pt. 3), supra note 92, at 471. 
96 See Lutz, Evolution (pt. 2), supra note 92, at 384 (comparing approaches in Su-
preme Court cases from the 1853 Term). 
97 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). 
98 126 U.S. 1 (1888). 
99 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 119-20. 
100 The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534-35. 
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trines regarding patentable subject matter or commensurability; mod-
ern patents cannot extend to laws or phenomena of nature, nor can 
they claim more than they enable, and the cases are often cited for 
these propositions.  But Bell’s claim recited a limitation to apparatus 
substantially similar to that described in his application, making ex-
plicit the doctrinal limitation on his centrally claimed invention, 
whereas Morse’s claim disclaimed any limitation to his disclosed em-
bodiment, making explicit the doctrinal expansion in his central 
claim.
It is clear that the Patent Act followed, rather than drove, these 
changing practices of courts and patent drafters.101  The 1836 Patent 
Act made no mention of claims, but it required the patentee to “par-
ticularly specify and point out” the novel features that constituted the 
invention—such “pointing” being understood as indicating the cen-
tral features of the invention.102  By 1870, claiming had become part of 
the statutory language—familiar to present practitioners, as it has 
been retained in the present statute—requiring that the patentee 
“particularly point out and distinctly claim” the novel features consti-
tuting the invention.103  Patent Office guidelines, too, followed rather 
than drove claiming practice, reflecting the changes that practitioners 
made in response to judicial trends.104
Claims were initially thought of only as devices for clarifying the 
grant of a patent for validity purposes, but after some period of time, 
courts began employing claims in determining infringement as well.  
The result of this shift, not surprisingly, was for claims drafters to at-
tempt to cover, by explicit claim language, every equivalent that a 
court might previously have recognized under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.105  Peripheral construction of claims gave every incentive for in-
ventors, and the attorneys who represented them, to begin claiming 
out to the very edge of what was patentable.106  Patent attorneys pro-
duced not only more elaborate and convoluted claims attempting to 
101 See ROBERT C. KAHRL, PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION § 2.04[A], at 2-37 (2001). 
102 ELLIS, supra note 20, at 4-5. 
103 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230 § 26, 16 Stat. 198.  John Duffy describes the patent 
office practice before that time in establishing the boundaries of claims.  John F. Duffy, 
The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 S. CT. REV.
273, 313 n.131. 
104 See Woodward, supra note 89, at 758; see also Lutz, Evolution (pt. 3), supra note 
92, at 464-66. 
105 See ELLIS, supra note 20, at 253. 
106 See id. at 123-24. 
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anticipate possible equivalents of the disclosed embodiment,107 but 
also a greater number of claims per patent.  Patentees began to recite 
multiple claims directed to different variations of the invention that 
were to be covered by the patent.108  This proliferation in the number of 
claims dramatically changed the structure of the patent document and 
refocused the practice of patent drafting and patent interpretation, 
leading some experts to observe that the United States patent system 
had become “claim ridden.”109  Even though the role of peripheral 
claiming was well established by the end of the nineteenth century, in 
practice that role was tempered by the way in which patent litigation ac-
tually occurred.  While patent rights were defined by the claims, the 
process of claim construction was not itself central to patent litigation.  
Rather, the parties litigated validity and infringement as largely factual 
questions, and often considered the language of the patent claims 
only incidentally, if at all.  This was particularly true in the last half of 
the twentieth century, when most patent cases began being tried to ju-
ries.  Juries were told to compare the patent claim to the defendant’s 
product, but it seems likely that even if they were not supposed to pay 
attention to what the patentee actually invented, they often did so.  In-
deed, the meaning of the claims themselves was sufficiently sub rosa 
that it was not until 1996 that courts even resolved the question of who 
was responsible for construing those claims.110  The significant role that 
the doctrine of equivalents played during that period also suggests that 
claims were not the last word in boundary definition.111
As a result, it may be fairer to say that during the twentieth cen-
tury we had not a peripheral-claiming system, but a hybrid peripheral-
claiming system.  Claims were intended to define the boundaries of 
the invention, but we treated the effective definition of those bounda-
ries as a fact-specific question for the judge or the jury and rarely 
opened the implicit boundary definition made in the factfinder’s 
black box.  It was only with the Markman decision in 1996 that we 
turned the definition of patent boundaries into a legal decision, made 
107 KAHRL, supra note 101, § 2.04[D], at 2-58. 
108 Id. § 2.04[B], at 2-49. 
109 Melville Church, Commentary, Comments on Recent Articles, 13 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
459, 459 (1931); see also ELLIS, supra note 20, at 7 (“As a result, patents had fewer 
claims before 1870 than they had later.”). 
110 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
111 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (estab-
lishing the propriety of the doctrine of equivalents and explaining how and when it 
was to be used). 
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transparently, and thus turned patent scope into an exercise in the in-
terpretation of words. 
B.  The Continuing Presence of Central Claiming 
This brief sketch of the history of claiming in U.S. patent practice 
suggests some reasons that central claiming fell into disuse, and it also 
suggests how the shift to peripheral claims resulted in a system that 
today is not simply “claim ridden” but actually claim burdened.  It 
suggests that the ascendance of peripheral claiming was not natural or 
inevitable, but was highly path dependent.  Clearly, central claiming 
functioned satisfactorily in U.S. patent law for a considerable period 
of time, during an epoch of robust innovation and technical devel-
opment.  Claiming practice might have evolved otherwise; indeed, as 
we shall see, it has in fact done so in some situations and jurisdictions. 
But if, as we suggest, there is reason to revisit central claiming, we 
must ask whether the practice was merely a historical curiosity, a lost 
relic of the nineteenth century, or whether there is evidence that cen-
tral claiming could function in a modern patent system.  In fact, we 
find that there is considerable evidence to this effect.  We draw evi-
dence of central claiming’s viability from its continued presence in 
current patent practice, from its employment in many other forms of 
IP, and from its use in other industrialized nations’ patent systems 
through much of the twentieth century. 
Central claiming is by no means foreign to modern patent prac-
tice.  Although the interpretive practice for claim interpretation has 
shifted over time from central to peripheral, elements of central 
claiming remain to this day within current patent doctrine—
sometimes in a guise so familiar that the practice is not recognized as 
central claiming, and sometimes posing contradictions and anomalies 
that puzzle and perplex modern scholars and practitioners.  For ex-
ample, U.S. courts under a peripheral-claiming regime continue to 
follow the rule that claims must be read in light of the patent specifi-
cation; at the same time, a parallel rule forbids them from importing 
elements from the specification into the claim.112  In practice, this set 
of rules is nearly impossible to follow, since no one can really tell 
when they have crossed the line from interpreting the claim in light of 
the specification to reading forbidden elements from the specification 
112 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (applying both rules). 
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into the claim.  The first rule is clearly a legacy of central-claiming 
practice, and the latter rule a canon of peripheral-claiming practice; 
the fact that they sit uneasily with one another is an artifact of claim-
ing history. 
The most prominent legacy from central claiming is likely found 
in the present-day doctrine of equivalents.  In the heyday of central 
claiming, claims were held to cover the disclosed invention and its 
equivalents.  This language of equivalents continues today in cases 
that hold that known substitutes for elements of the claimed inven-
tion, or those that produce the same result in the same way, are cov-
ered by the claims even if the claims do not literally read upon devices 
incorporating such alternatives.  But although the language of 
“equivalents” is common to both these doctrines, commentators have 
been quick to point out that similarity in terminology is not necessar-
ily correspondence in concept or effect.113  Under central claiming, 
equivalence constituted an expansion of the claims; that is, equiva-
lents considered under central claiming go beyond the language of 
the claim, whereas equivalents under peripheral claiming must be 
those encompassed by the claim.114  To the outside observer, it seems 
plain that under either system, equivalents go beyond the claim, but 
the dogma of peripheral claiming demands that the claim remain the 
outer bound of the patent, even if courts must go beyond their literal 
meaning to reach a sensible result.  In short, modern courts engaged 
in doctrine of equivalents analysis follow a form of central claiming 
while denying that they do so. 
We are not the first to note that central claiming is no stranger to 
the current Patent Act, in the doctrine of equivalents and elsewhere; 
the Supreme Court has similarly observed aspects of central claiming 
under current practice.  In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemi-
cal Co.,115 addressing the petitioner’s arguments that peripheral claim-
ing was inconsistent with the doctrine of equivalents, and that the 
doctrine was concomitantly inconsistent with the statutory require-
ment to “distinctly claim” the invention, the Court noted that the doc-
113 See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 20, § 10. 
114 Thus, Judge Rich, one of the drafters of the current Patent Act, goes to some 
pains to insist that the doctrine of equivalents gives the patentee only what she would 
have been entitled to had the language of her claims been properly precise.  See Wilson 
Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(Rich, J.), overruled in part on other grounds by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 
508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
115 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
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trine of equivalents has grown up since the advent of peripheral 
claiming and reiterated its holding that the doctrine is compatible 
with current obligations to describe and claim the invention.116  The 
Court also noted persistent characteristics of central claiming in other 
areas of current practice, offering for example that “judicial recogni-
tion of so-called ‘pioneer’ patents suggests that the abandonment of 
‘central’ claiming may be overstated.”117
The reverse doctrine of equivalents, too, has its origins in the 
practice of central claiming.118  Reverse equivalents constitutes an op-
tional component of literal claim analysis, relieving the accused in-
fringer of liability if the accused device, despite falling within the lit-
eral scope of the claims, is so far changed in principle that it performs 
a different function in a different way than the equivalent structure in 
the patent.  The classic statement of reverse equivalents comes from 
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co.,119 a case decided near the end of 
the central claiming era.  Westinghouse involved an allegedly infringing 
locomotive air brake that comprised structures, including a particular 
valve, that read on the language of the patent in suit.120  But in consid-
ering the accused device, the court determined that the valve per-
formed a different function than the analogous structure in the pat-
ented air brake.121  This finding placed the accused device within the 
periphery of the claim language, but outside the invention of the pat-
ent—the allegedly infringing device was so far changed in principle 
that it no longer incorporated the gist or character of the patented in-
vention.  Hence, no infringement was found even though the claims 
literally read on the device. 
The reverse doctrine of equivalents has not been applied much in 
recent years, and Federal Circuit judges have sometimes even sug-
gested that the doctrine is dead.  But the reports of its death have 
been exaggerated.  The court does still apply the doctrine on occa-
sion.122
116 Id. at 26 n.3 & 27 n.4. 
117 Id. at 27 n.4. 
118 See Lutz, Evolution (pt. 3), supra note 92, at 473-74. 
119 170 U.S. 537 (1898). 
120 Id. at 537-38. 
121 Id. at 583. 
122 The doctrine is rarely applied, and the Federal Circuit in Tate Access Floors, Inc. 
v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002), suggested 
that the doctrine had no continued meaning after the passage of the 1952 Patent Act.  
The court also (misleadingly) suggested that it had never applied the doctrine.  Cf.
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
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The legacy of central claiming also lives on in the practice of 
means-plus-function claiming.  Section 112 of the Patent Act expressly 
permits claiming elements of the invention in terms of a “means” for 
performing some function; the scope of the claim extends not to all 
possible means of performing that function, but only to those dis-
closed in the specification, plus equivalents thereof.123  This referential 
structure is precisely the same as that found under the former regime 
of central claiming; patentees would routinely claim their invention 
“substantially as described,” that is, as disclosed in the specification.124
And that disclosed embodiment would constitute the exemplar, sup-
plemented by protection afforded to equivalent devices. 
Central claiming also continues to function outside of patents as a 
mainstay of IP analysis.  Modern patent practice ostensibly embraces 
peripheral claiming.  But in IP generally, the peripheral claiming 
scheme of patent law is the odd man out.  Other forms of IP tend to-
ward a central claiming approach rather than attempting to linguisti-
cally delimit the exclusive rights associated with their subject matter.  
The patent system’s parallel constitutional IP system—copyright—
involves no peripheral claims.  When determining the extent of the 
exclusive rights in copyright, courts do not rely on a description of the 
work, but rather look to the fixed format of the work itself as the start-
ing point for determining the scope of protection.  In the paradigm 
copyright case, where the protected work is a book, play, poem or 
other text, it is that text that constitutes the “core” or “gist” of the 
work; indeed, it would seem more than a little odd to copyright law-
yers to suggest that copyright holders should draft some “metatext” 
describing the metes and bounds of the copyrighted text.125  Copyright 
cases then ask whether the allegedly infringing text is “substantially 
similar” to the copyrighted work126—akin to comparing the patentee’s 
disclosed invention to the defendant’s product. 
1991) (applying the reverse doctrine of equivalents).  The Federal Circuit has since 
backed off from this crabbed and ahistorical reading.  See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst 
Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting the dictum from 
Tate Access).
123 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
124 See ELLIS, supra note 20, § 24; Lutz, Evolution (pt. 3), supra note 92, at 470. 
125 But many judicial opinions concerning copyright infringement might be de-
scribed as such “metatexts,” as they typically spend a considerable number of words 
describing the scope and protected features of the copyrighted text. 
126 See, e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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Similarly, trademark law entails a type of analysis involving the 
“heart” or “gist” of the exclusive right and leaves determination of its 
boundaries to courts on a case-by-case basis.  Trademark law begins 
not with a description of the metes and bounds of the trademark 
right, setting out the fullest extent of protection, but rather with the 
mark itself—the logo, symbol, sound, or smell that a consumer would 
associate with the source of goods or services.  Under a likelihood-of-
confusion standard, the analysis then asks whether an allegedly in-
fringing mark would be considered sufficiently similar to be confusing 
to an ordinary observer.127
A similar pattern holds true in the law of trade secrets.  Trade se-
crets are notoriously difficult to define in judicial pleadings and dis-
covery orders.  For strategic reasons, it is in a defendant’s interests to 
attempt definition as early in a suit as possible, but in a plaintiff’s in-
terests to delay definition until as late in a suit as possible.128  Many ju-
risdictions require a plaintiff to “identify the trade secret with reason-
able particularity”129 before discovery in an enforcement action can 
proceed.  As in central claiming, the burden is on the owner of the 
trade secret to describe what she considers her confidential business 
information, rather than to describe the boundary that defines mis-
appropriation.130
One might reasonably object that copyright and trade secret law 
are different because both require proof of copying and therefore 
proof of access to, and use of, the plaintiff’s work.131  In that context, 
the legal definition of the boundaries of the invention might be less 
important, for we know that the defendant started from the plaintiff’s 
work.  As such, the only issue is the strength of the legal right, not the 
factual definition of what is included. 
127 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114; see also, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman:  The Pub-
lic Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999) (discussing the standard set 
forth in the Lanham Act). 
128 See Kevin R. Casey, Identification of Trade Secrets During Discovery:  Timing and 
Specificity, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 254 (1996). 
129 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210 (West 2007); see also AutoMed Techs., 
Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (applying the requirement that a 
plaintiff first identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity); Porous Media 
Corp. v. Midland Brake, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 598, 599-600 (D. Minn. 1999) (same); Engel-
hard Corp. v. Savin Corp., 505 A.2d 30, 33 (Del. Ch. 1986) (same). 
130 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210. 
131 See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding, due in part to the 
fact that plaintiff’s song was not commercially successful, that there was no access and 
therefore no copying to support an infringement claim); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 
1, 14 U.L.A. 538 (2006) (amended 1985). 
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Even if that argument justifies distinguishing copyright and trade 
secret from peripheral claiming systems, it does not explain trade-
mark law, which has no requirement of copying.132  Neither does it ex-
plain the role of central claiming within the patent system, where util-
ity patents are unique in their reliance on peripheral claiming.  
Design patents set forth an image of their subject and claim the de-
sign as presented; the Federal Circuit recently rejected the idea that 
the image itself should be subject to a Markman-style claim-
construction process.133  Similarly, because of the difficulty of present-
ing a written description of a distinctive plant, plant patents typically 
use an image of the foliage or flower covered by the patent; this ex-
emplar of the actual invention is the starting place for determination 
of validity or infringement, another example of central claiming.134
Central claiming also operated as the norm in major industrial-
ized nations well into the late twentieth century.  For example, Korea 
employed central claiming until a statutory change in 1980 instituted 
peripheral claiming; even then, courts continued to apply central-
claiming methods well into the 1990s.135  Central claiming was also the 
approach in Germany until accession to the European Patent Conven-
tion required harmonization with the peripheral approaches of other 
EPC member states; at that point, Germany moved to an intermediate 
position that continues to incorporate many aspects of central claim-
ing.136  For the last several decades it has sought to integrate the two, 
using peripheral claiming as a starting point but making liberal use of 
the doctrine of equivalents and purposive claim interpretation.137
Nonetheless, the German Federal Supreme Court has reaffirmed the 
central-claiming-based “substantial difference” test.138  Thus, Germany 
has to some extent oscillated between the two approaches to claim 
132 But cf. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark In-
fringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1626-31 (2006) (finding that intent, one of many fac-
tors relevant to a finding of likelihood of confusion, is in fact the most important one). 
133 See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
134 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2006). 
135 See C. Leon Kim, Transition from Central to Peripheral Definition Patent Claim Inter-
pretation System in Korea, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401, 411 (1995). 
136 See WILFRIED STOCKMAIR, THE PROTECTION OF TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS AND 
DESIGNS IN GERMANY 93 (1994); TAKENAKA, supra note 14, at 36-38. 
137 See TAKENAKA, supra note 14, at 36-38; Allan M. Soobert, Analyzing Infringement 
by Equivalents:  A Proposal to Focus the Scope of International Patent Protection, 22 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 189, 207-11 (1996). 
138 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 29, 1986, 98 
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 12 (14) (F.R.G.), 
translated and excerpted in 18 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 795, 798 (1987). 
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construction:  German claiming practice began with peripheral claim-
ing in the nineteenth century, then, in counterpoint to the movement 
of claiming practice in the United States, moved away from peripheral 
claiming toward central claiming.139
Even countries like the United Kingdom, which nominally prac-
tice peripheral claiming, rarely do so with the literalism that U.S. prac-
tice has adopted.  In Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd.,
for example, the British House of Lords rejected the literalism of U.S. 
peripheral claiming in favor of a more functional definition of the 
claim driven by what the patentee actually invented.140
Finally, it may be that central claiming persisted even in U.S. pat-
ent law until the late twentieth century.  While we have had claims for 
over a century, the fact that claim construction was not a separate 
process until 1995 arguably permitted juries and even judges to effec-
tively focus on what the patentee actually invented, even if the claims 
pointed in a different direction.  Thus, John Golden argues that while 
we adopted claims in the 1870s, “the true triumph of modern periph-
eral claiming occurred about one hundred years later, in the last dec-
ades of the twentieth century.”141
C.  Rules and Standards in Claim Construction 
In previous Sections we have reviewed a variety of instances where 
central claiming operates successfully.  This survey also says something 
about the provenance of central-claiming practices.  Though billed as 
a “peripheral claiming” system, the U.S. system is, at best, a hybrid, 
where elements of a central-claiming legacy intermingle with the cur-
rent apparatus of peripheral claiming.  Although this is not as explic-
itly clear in the U.S. system as it is in the German system—in part be-
cause the German shift toward peripheral claiming is more recent—
familiarity with U.S. patent doctrine reveals a system often at odds 
139 For a detailed discussion of claim construction in Germany, see TAKENAKA, su-
pra note 14, at 26-38. 
140 [2004] UKHL 46 (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ.)) (U.K.). 
141 John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive Commu-
nity”:  A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 349, 352-
55 (2008); see also Paul M. Janicke, Heat of Passion:  What Really Happened in Graver 
Tank, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (1996) (describing the hybrid system that existed before the 
1950 decision in Graver Tank).
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with itself, attempting to reconcile the elements of central and pe-
ripheral claiming.142
The differences between central claiming and peripheral claiming 
bear all the hallmarks of the classic debate over the relative virtues of 
rules and standards.143  There is a large literature exploring the char-
acteristics of these two types of legal formulations:  on the one hand, 
bright-line, defined legal “rules” that attempt to precisely delineate le-
gally acceptable behavior; and on the other hand, flexible, more 
nebulous “standards” that offer guidance rather than precision in ar-
ticulating expected behavior but allow tailoring to the facts of specific 
cases.  Rules are sometimes described as “crystalline,” having clear and 
explicit definitions; standards are sometimes described as “muddy,” 
having more fuzzy or inchoate parameters.144
Both types of imperatives are found in the law, and both have 
their virtues and vices.145  The two form something of an inverse, 
matched pair; the virtues of rules complement the vices of standards, 
and vice versa.  The upside of rules is that they give clear guidance as 
to expected behavior; the downside is that they do not accommodate 
142 For example, Jeff Lefstin traces current doctrinal tensions between the written-
description requirement and claim definiteness to unresolved incongruities arising in 
the shift from central to peripheral claiming.  Lefstin, supra note 83 (manuscript at 88-
89).  Lefstin has identified a fundamental disjunction in modern patent doctrine that 
may only be resolvable by a return to central claiming. 
143 Jeanne Fromer has made a similar point.  See Fromer, supra note 15 (manu-
script at 28-31). 
144 The body of literature on this topic is extensive.  See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and 
Legal Form:  Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Stan-
dards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997); Pierre Schlag, 
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules,
83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995). 
 For a debate on the merits of rules and standards in patent law, see ROBERT PAT-
RICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 805-06 (3d ed. 2002); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U.
L. REV. 771, 792-96 (2003); R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel:  Patent Administration 
and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 234-37 (2002).  See also Thomas Chen, 
Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 
1175 (2008) (noting the need to trade off the “simultaneous challenges of inefficiency, 
indeterminacy, and information costs”). 
145 See, e.g., MindGames, Inc. v. Western Pub. Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 
2000) (Posner, J.) (“No sensible person supposes that rules are always superior to stan-
dards, or vice versa.”). 
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specific and unforeseen factual circumstances.  Standards display the 
inverse set of benefits and detriments:  they are flexible enough to ac-
commodate specific and unforeseen factual circumstances, but they 
give poor advance guidance as to expected behavior. 
Perhaps the most important characteristic of these distinctive 
classes of imperatives is that rules and standards contemplate deci-
sions made at different times.  Under rules, the expected behavior is 
determined ex ante, whereas standards leave that determination to be 
made ex post.  Thus, the ability or inability to foresee relevant factual 
scenarios and responses favors either rules or standards.  Standards 
are preferable where the circumstances likely to arise are difficult to 
determine ahead of time and proper behavior is best defined after an 
actual situation has occurred.  By contrast, rules are preferable where 
it is feasible to anticipate the likely facts ahead of time and predeter-
mine the applicable behavior. 
A rules/standards distinction grounded in foreseeability and tem-
porality carries with it implications for institutional competence.  In-
stitutions that are equipped for ex ante investigation and determina-
tion are best suited to develop rule-based imperatives.  Institutions 
that are better equipped for ex post factfinding and response should 
generally be entrusted with standards-based imperatives.  As a practi-
cal matter, in the American legal system this means that legislatures 
tend to set rules and courts tend to apply standards, with administra-
tive agencies functioning in both capacities, sometimes setting regula-
tions and sometimes adjudicating cases. 
In drawing distinctions between rules and standards, it is critical 
to realize that these classifications are not pristine—pure rules and 
pure standards are a rarity, and the classification itself identifies the 
polar ends of a continuum, with a range of hybrids arrayed between 
the poles.  Nor are these designations static; the character of both 
rules and standards is generally in flux.  As Carol Rose has noted, rules 
tend to progress toward standards over time, as the rigidity of a rule 
leads to absurd or unjust results.146  The explicit imperatives of the 
rule will be infused by adjudicators or administrators with standard-
like flexibility.  This softening of the rules’ hard edges occurs over 
time until the rule effectively becomes a standard.  The inverse proc-
ess occurs with standards:  to save time and effort, adjudicators who 
are administering standards will begin to carve out bright-line, ex-
plicit, or per se rules for situations that seem clear and foreseeable.  As 
146 See Rose, supra note 12, at 580-90. 
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these carve-outs accrete over time, the standard may eventually 
harden into a set of rules.  Having reached the opposite end of the 
continuum from where they began, the transformed rules or stan-
dards may then begin the reverse evolution, precessing back toward 
the pole where they began. 
The history we have described, leading to the formulation of pe-
ripheral rules in the United States, closely follows the paradigm that 
Carol Rose and others set out for the precession between rules and 
standards.  Searching for greater certainty, courts and patent attorneys 
substituted the ostensibly bright lines of peripheral claiming for the 
flexible standards of central claiming.  But the search for such cer-
tainty is particularly problematic in the case of patent claims.  The 
idea that patent language could offer public notice comparable to the 
“metes and bounds” of real property is an appealing, and as we have 
seen, pervasive trope.  As Jeff Lefstin points out, the metes and 
bounds of a property line define a single physical entity, but the pe-
ripherally construed claims of a patent are directed to multiple theo-
retical entities.147  Thus metes and bounds are simultaneously both a 
central and a peripheral claim.  In the case of real property, the legal 
and physical boundaries of real property coincide; so too with the le-
gal description of a chattel, such as an automobile identified by make, 
model, year, and vehicle identification number (VIN).  These descrip-
tions of physical property define a physical limit to which legal rights 
attach, an actual border within which the owner enjoys the preroga-
tives of ownership.   
That doesn’t mean there are never disputes over real property 
rights—there surely are—but they are almost always disputes over the 
legal consequences of real property, not over whether a particular 
piece of land is within the scope of the property at all.  This is gener-
ally not the case for peripheral patent claims.  Certainly some patent 
claims may be so narrow as to encompass only a single embodiment of 
the invention, in which case the physical and legal borders of the 
claims will coincide.148  But typically, patent claims that are peripher-
147 Lefstin, supra note 83 (manuscript at 63). 
148 The question of boundary coincidence bears on Fromer’s argument that de-
pendent patent claims are central embodiments of broader independent claims.  See
Fromer, supra note 15 (manuscript at 16).  Certainly because dependent claims are 
usually narrowed claims, perhaps even reading on a single embodiment of the inven-
tion, their legal boundaries may tend to coincide more nearly with the physical 
boundary of a given embodiment of the invention.  But under current practice they 
are still clearly peripherally construed. 
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ally construed will define a legal border far beyond the physical pa-
rameters of the inventor’s actual embodiment:  not one automobile, 
but many, some of which do not exist, never did exist, and quite pos-
sibly never will exist.  Peripheral claim language seeks to encompass 
those nonexistent embodiments and so cannot offer even the degree 
of deterministic certainty that a physical description would give.149
Consequently, the quest for definitional certainty falters.  As the 
theory predicts, bright lines are often not all they promise to be; they 
don’t fit many situations in practice and have to be altered, fudged, 
and even discarded when the fit is poor.  Eventually, the alterations, 
fudging, and discarding become so pronounced that the rules effec-
tively become standards, and they eventually become recognized as 
such.  Germany has seen such a claim-construction cycle, from pe-
ripheral claiming to central and back again.  It may be that the 
anomalies in the U.S. system have reached the point that it is time for 
the wheel to turn again here as well. 
We think that the theory also tells us something additional about 
the failure of peripheral claiming that we described in Part I.  Bright-
line rules work best where an institution is able to determine the op-
timal legal imperative ex ante.  Standards work best where an institu-
tion is able to determine the optimal legal imperative ex post.  The 
patent system entails one of each type of institution:  an administrative 
agency, of the sort that is probably best suited to ex ante rulemaking, 
and a court system, that is probably best suited to ex post adjudication.  
Claims are formed in the first institution but interpreted in the sec-
ond.  And the selection of a bright-line peripheral-claiming approach 
for judicial claim-construction confounds this allocation of authority. 
It is virtually impossible for any institution to make sensible pre-
dictions about a particular patentable innovation:  about the applica-
tions that will emerge for the patentee’s invention, the variations of 
the invention that might develop, the competing or substitute tech-
nologies that will arise, or the dependence or independence of com-
plementary technologies to the given invention.  Institutionally, the 
Patent Office, with a corps of technical experts, is well positioned to 
tell us whether the invention is novel, innovative and significant, or, 
more often, to tell us whether it was so at the time of invention or ap-
plication filing date.  But the PTO is composed of technical experts, 
not legal experts or economists, and certainly not crystal-ball gazers.  
The PTO cannot tell what the proper scope of the patent will be going 
149 See Lefstin, supra note 83. 
1782 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1743
into the future, particularly given the paucity of resources available for 
examination and the limited time spent with any given application.  It 
is not at all clear that it would make any difference if additional re-
sources were made available.  As one of us has argued elsewhere, 
given the negligible social value of most patents, it is inconceivable 
that we would want to invest the resources necessary to fully vet every 
patent application for validity,150 much less the resources that would 
be required to accurately predict all the ways that the market might 
use or modify an invention.  And using the PTO to determine patent 
scope is particularly problematic given that patent examiners have no 
experience evaluating infringement as opposed to patent validity.  
Rather, the innovations that are worth fighting for sort themselves out 
over time and are vetted by the institution best able to make an ex 
post determination regarding patent value and scope:  the courts. 
Determinations of patent infringement and validity are placed in 
the hands of courts, which are largely retrospective institutions, in-
crementally calibrating the proper legal imperative case by case, ex 
post.  We have argued elsewhere that this is not a mistake—that courts 
are best equipped as custodians of patent doctrine.151  But peripheral 
claiming stands this custody on its head, purporting to set forth the 
maximal boundary of the patent grant during the application process, 
before the measure of the inventor’s contribution or the different 
variants that competitors might adopt can be properly assessed.  Of 
course, some infringement cases will prove to be blatant, free-riding 
misappropriation of the inventor’s contributions, but many other al-
leged infringements will prove to be more nuanced.152  Some will even 
be blatant, expansionist market-grabbing by the inventor. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that looking at patent claims ex 
post, courts are often forced to devise some “breathing room” at the 
edges of the claims to secure sensible results.  With the doctrine of 
equivalents no longer of much significance, increasingly courts do so 
150 See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L.
REV. 1495, 1497 (2001) (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a competi-
tor, it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few 
cases than to invest in additional resources examining patents that will never be heard 
from again.”). 
151 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 18, at 95 (noting that courts are the right place 
for conducting a “sensitive policy analysis” for the patent system). 
152 Cf. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270160 (finding 
that only a tiny percentage of patent cases involve copying as opposed to independent 
invention by defendants). 
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by distorting the boundaries of the claims while professing to honor 
them.  In Part I, we showed numerous examples in which the words of 
claims were stretched to their limit, and beyond.153  This type of inter-
pretive legerdemain seems to be evidence that courts have been en-
gaged in a sort of central claiming all along.  Far from representing 
the outer perimeter of the patentee’s exclusive rights, claim language 
has come to constitute merely a jumping-off point for judicial explora-
tion of the patent’s actual outer boundaries.  If courts, as a practical 
matter, aren’t paying peripheral claim construction more than lip ser-
vice, then perhaps it is time to explicitly reinstate central claiming as 
the preferred approach.154
III. IMPLEMENTING CENTRAL CLAIMING
What we have said so far suggests that much of the trouble in cur-
rent treatment of claims arises from the unrealistic expectations built 
into the system of peripheral claiming.  While peripheral claiming 
forces the courts into the protracted and expensive interpretive cha-
rade that typifies modern claim construction, central claiming would 
allow the courts to modulate the scope of patents, as they are best 
suited to do.  But dethroning the centrality of the “fence post” patent 
claim would require some significant changes to the way the current 
patent system operates.  Peripheral claiming did not emerge in the 
United States or elsewhere overnight, and it will not disappear over-
night either.  As we have noted in the recent example of the German 
patent system, hybrids may emerge in the transition of one approach 
to the other.155  Consequently, we consider two things here:  the likely 
effects of a complete shift to central claiming, and certain intermedi-
ate measures that might serve as a prelude to full-fledged central 
claiming, which by themselves might ameliorate many of the problems 
that we have identified here. 
A.  How Central Claiming Might Work in the United States 
To consider the ramifications of a shift to central claiming, we 
must look systematically at the likely effects on the institutions that 
153 See supra notes 5-9. 
154 Terry Fisher put it this way to us:  peripheral claiming is a local maximum.  We 
have spent enormous effort getting to the top of the hill, but we could get much 
higher if we abandoned this hill, moved across the plain, and climbed a different 
mountain.
155 See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text. 
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mediate the patent system:  the Patent Office, the courts, and to some 
extent the patent bar.  We consider first how the patent document 
might change under central claiming, where such changes might be 
initiated, and whether a system of central claiming will serve the pur-
poses of patent law. 
1.  Do We Need Patent Claims at All? 
As a practical matter, the shift from peripheral to central claiming 
could occur in one of two ways.  The first would be to jettison claims 
altogether as a separate feature of the patent document.  This would 
essentially return to the pre-1870 practice of preparing a patent 
document where the written description of the invention serves to de-
fine the basis for the patent right.  Claims would of course be available 
as a drafting strategy if the patentee felt that they would assist her in 
describing the novel features and principle of the invention.  But 
since they would not define the scope of the invention, there would 
be less incentive to use them at all, and certainly far less incentive to 
obsess over them in the way that current claim practice does. 
Some might view this approach as the most radical embrace of 
central claiming, in part because it would be the most apparent:  it 
would alter the format of the patent document.  It might also be con-
sidered the most radical for a different reason:  the Patent Act re-
quires the patentee to “distinctly claim” the invention.156  As we have 
discussed above, this phrase has, since its introduction into the statute 
in 1870, been understood to refer to, and to require, a separate sec-
tion of the patent document called “claims.”157  Since separate claims 
had become the practice at the time of the 1870 statute, the statute 
was understood to recognize and formalize that practice.158  Absent a 
statutory amendment to remove the reference to “claims,” failure to 
include discrete claims might be viewed as failing to meet the re-
quirements of the statute. 
It is not clear to us that the statute need necessarily be read this 
way.  As discussed above, claims arose in order to identify the novel 
features of inventions in patent applications.159  If the statutory lan-
guage is read as intended to accomplish that goal—to have patentees 
156 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
157 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
158 Lutz, Evolution (pt. 3), supra note 92, at 470. 
159 Cf. ELLIS, supra note 20, at 3; Lutz, Evolution (pt. 1), supra note 92, at 142; Lutz, 
Evolution (pt. 3), supra note 92, at 467. 
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designate or claim the novel features of their invention—then this 
function need not necessarily be addressed by a separate section of 
the document.  It can be done in the specification and drawings—the 
patentee could even use the term “I claim” in some part of the specifi-
cation, not separately broken out as discrete claims (a practice that 
was in fact seen in some nineteenth-century patents).  The legislative 
intent could plausibly be seen as requiring some type of “claim,” but 
not the separate claims that were the practice when the “claim” lan-
guage was added to the statute.  This view of the statute might not sit 
well with some as a matter of legislative intent, but it would not be the 
first time that a court would have recognized the purpose dictated by 
a statute as superior to a particular form that seems to be dictated by 
that statute. 
We suspect that many in the patent community would find the 
second option more palatable:  leave claims in place as a separate fea-
ture of the patent document but stop reading them as peripheral 
“boundaries” and start reading them as part of the overall description 
of the invention as actually conceived and executed by the inventor.  
This option would essentially return to the late-nineteenth-century 
practice, around the time of the 1870 statute, of employing and even 
requiring claims, but treating them as central rather than periph-
eral.160  This could avoid any need for a statutory revision; the Patent 
Act refers to claims but says nothing about how they are to be re-
garded or interpreted.  Of course, there might be some virtue in a leg-
islative imperative to get the courts and the PTO headed in the same 
direction at the same time.  But peripheral claiming—and claims 
themselves—evolved through judicial practice with legislative recogni-
tion following later; we see no reason that a return to central claiming 
could not happen similarly. 
Eliminating the requirement that claims appear as a separate fea-
ture of the patent document would have significant advantages.  Cen-
tral claiming will work best if the court’s attention is focused on the 
patentee’s invention rather than on the patent lawyer’s words attempt-
ing to define that invention.  In addition, the practice of peripheral 
claiming may be so ingrained in the patent bar after more than a cen-
tury of experience that lawyers would be tempted to write claims in 
peripheral terms, making it harder for judges to apply central claim-
ing to those claims. 
160 See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text. 
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While this approach would not require claims, it should not forbid 
them either, as they might be useful in some cases to describe the in-
vention.  We suspect that inventive activity in certain fields might lend 
itself to the current claim format, even if current experience demon-
strates that inventive activity in many fields does not.  Additionally, we 
view the voluntary availability of claims as beneficial in part because 
voluntary claims might best facilitate the adoption of hybrid or inter-
mediate forms of claiming that we discuss below.  In any event, in the 
sections that follow we explore how a world without claims, or with 
explicitly central claims, might work. 
2.  Central Claims in the PTO 
We turn next to the impact of central claiming, beginning at the 
PTO, where things would change substantially, and almost certainly 
for the better.  The PTO today is overwhelmed.  Patent pendency is 
much longer than it has ever been, and the problem is getting worse, 
not better.  The PTO is not even keeping pace with new applications, 
much less eating into the enormous backlog.161  Much of the time and 
cost of the prosecution process—and much of the backlog occasioned 
by continuation applications—result from drafting, evaluating, and 
arguing over patent claims.  Patent lawyers spend far more time and 
money drafting patent claims than they do tinkering with the actual 
disclosure of the patent.  While the PTO does not expressly engage in 
a process of claim construction,162 it does need to implicitly determine 
what patent claims mean in order to decide whether they are antici-
pated by or obvious in view of the prior art.163  And even when the ex-
aminer and the applicant are not arguing over what the patent claims 
161 See, e.g., Ron D. Katznelson, President, Bi-Level Techs., Presentation at Fenwick 
& West Lecture Series Inaugural Symposium, UC Davis School of Law:  The Perfect 
Storm of Patent Reform? (Nov. 7, 2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/ 
rkatznelson/54. 
162 For suggestions that the PTO should be more involved in claim construction, 
see, for example, Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Con-
struction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177 (2005); see also  Chen, supra note 144.  But see
William R. Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights:  The Impor-
tance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327 (2009) (argu-
ing that ex ante scope determinations will not work and that we must wait to define 
patent scope in the context of particular disputes).  We are inclined to Hubbard’s view 
on this point. 
163 See, e.g., In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying the rule that 
the PTO gives patents their “broadest reasonable interpretation” rather than choosing 
a specific construction).  For a discussion of that rule and its problems, see Michael 
Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179 (2007). 
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cover, they still spend most of the patent-application process compar-
ing the prior art to the patent claims, arguing about the differences, 
and most importantly, amending the claims to try to make them pat-
entable.164  Claim-construction worries, disputes, and amendments are 
also primarily responsible for the significant growth in the use of pat-
ent continuations and requests for continued examination (RCEs), 
which in turn are responsible for a significant part of the delay in pat-
ent prosecution.165
Patent prosecution without peripheral claims would look very dif-
ferent.  Applicants would still submit, and examiners would still search 
for, prior art.  But they would not have to spend time drafting, argu-
ing about, or amending patent claims.  Nor would there be any reason 
for applicants to file continuations or RCEs, since the patented inven-
tion would be the same under central claiming regardless.  The com-
bination will lead to lower-cost applications and more efficient (and 
therefore hopefully quicker) examinations.166  Examiners who need to 
spend less time with any given application can process more applica-
tions, which will reduce the backlog.  Alternatively, they can devote 
more time to reading and evaluating prior art for any given applica-
tion, reducing the risk of error.  In addition, the elimination of any 
need for continuation applications will both reduce the backlog prob-
lem by ending delay and reduce the number of applications that the 
office must process. 
3.  Central Claiming in Litigation 
Central claiming would also have significant advantages once a 
patent issued.  The primary advantage of central claiming is that it 
puts the focus on what the patentee actually invented rather than on 
what patent lawyers later (often much later) drafted as claims to cover 
the ground in that invention.  By eliminating collateral disputes over 
164 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 150, at 1499-1500. 
165 On the growth of patent continuations over time, see, for example, Stuart J.H. 
Graham & David C. Mowery, Submarines in Software?  Continuations in U.S. Software Pat-
enting in the 1980s and 1990s, 13 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 443 (2004); Lemley 
& Sampat, supra note 71.  On the role of continuations in causing delay in patent 
prosecution, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of 
Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004).  One form of continuation—the con-
tinuation-in-part (CIP) application—would presumably continue in a central-claiming 
regime. 
166 Cf. Samson Vermont, Taming the Doctrine of Equivalents in Light of Patent Failure,
16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 83, 91 (2008) (noting that the doctrine of equivalents reduces 
the cost of drafting claims by avoiding the need to anticipate every eventuality). 
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the meaning of claim language not written by the inventor,167 and of-
tentimes not written anytime near the invention date, central claiming 
can protect both patentees and accused infringers.  Patentees are pro-
tected from claim-drafting errors that impose unnecessary limits on 
the scope of their claims, in many cases rendering them effectively 
worthless.168  Accused infringers are protected from strategic claim 
drafting that expands the patent to cover things well beyond the con-
templation of the inventor.169  And courts are given the power to de-
termine the scope of a patent based on the inventive contribution that 
167 See, e.g., Dana Wang, A Process Model of Creating and Out-Licensing Intellec-
tual Property (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (employing a case 
study to investigate the various contributors to the creation of a patent beyond the in-
ventor). 
168 A striking example is Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004), where the Federal Circuit held that a patent claim that mistakenly called 
for heating dough “to” 400 degrees rather than “at” 400 degrees was infringed only if 
defendants actually incinerated their bread.  While Chef America is extreme in its reli-
ance on form over substance in claim construction, there are any number of cases in 
which words collateral to the main dispute are given meaning that renders the claim 
ineffective.  See, e.g., Larami Corp. v. Amron, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1280, 1283 (E.D. 
Pa. 1993) (interpreting “chamber therein for a liquid” in a toy water gun patent in 
such a way that an external liquid reservoir does not literally infringe the claim, when 
in fact the main dispute was over the use of air pressure).  Claim constructions also of-
ten render the invention less valuable than intended by excluding from scope things 
the patentee clearly intended to include.  See, e.g., Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 
F.2d 1558, 1562-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (construing the term “right angle corner pieces,” 
in a patent for a method of affixing fabric to a wall, as encompassing only preformed 
corner pieces and not mitered linear pieces); Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom 
Equip. Inc., No. 08-1027 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2008) (relying on language “partially hid-
den from view” to exclude plaintiff’s own embodiment from the scope of its patent); 
Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (refusing 
to correct a patent claim for a fireplace that included the phrase “rear walls” rather 
than “rear wall”). 
 This can’t be good public policy.  As Chief Justice Marshall put it in one of the ear-
liest Supreme Court patent cases, “If, by an innocent mistake, the [patent] fails in its 
object, the public ought not to avail itself of this mistake, and to appropriate the dis-
covery without paying.”  Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 244 (1832). 
169 Examples here are legion.  Acacia claims to have invented video on demand, In 
re Acacia Media Techs. Corp., No. 05-1114, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37009 (N.D. Ca. Jul. 
19, 2005), Caritas to have invented VoIP, Caritas Techs., Inc. v. Comcast Corp., No. 05-
0339, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98006 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2006),  Rembrandt to have in-
vented digital television, Harris Corp. v. Rembrandt Techs., No. 07-0796, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 69680 (M.D. Fla., Sept. 20, 2007), Freeny to have invented multimedia, 
Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and 
BT to have invented global e-commerce, British Telecomm. PLC v. Prodigy Communs. 
Corp., 189 F. Supp. 2d 101 (2002), all based not on what they actually designed or de-
scribed in the patent but on the fact that the language of their patent claims can be 
read in hindsight to cover those later-developed technologies. 
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the patentee actually made, rather than on the vagaries of claim draft-
ing and the skill of lawyers on both sides at exploiting claim ambiguity. 
B.  Considering Objections to Central Claiming 
These advantages do not come without cost, however.  At the 
PTO, the cost is primarily in the assessment of novelty and nonobvi-
ousness.  An invention is anticipated (i.e., not novel) if each and every 
element of the invention is present in a single piece of prior art.170  An 
invention is obvious if one of ordinary skill in the art would be moti-
vated and able to produce the invention without undue effort.171  Un-
der peripheral claiming, the PTO compares the prior art to the full 
range of the claims to the prior art, finding a genus claim anticipated 
if the prior art overlaps with it even in a small part.  Put another way, if 
a patent claims a group of a thousand different chemicals, evidence 
that even one of those chemicals was already known will invalidate the 
patent claim.  So too with obviousness. 
But the absence of a well-defined boundary creates a problem for 
this analysis.  Suppose the patentee has discovered a new class of 
chemicals, but in a central claiming system merely discloses the 
chemicals she has actually used.  How is the PTO to know whether the 
invention is anticipated or rendered obvious by a different chemical 
in the prior art?172  We can imagine two different approaches.  First, 
170 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
171 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399-400. 
172 Central claiming may also have implications for PTO interference practice.  
Interferences are proceedings conducted by the Patent Office to determine priority of 
invention when there is more than one claimant to a patent.  35 U.S.C. § 146.  Inter-
ferences are conducted with reference to a “count”—a manufactured claim con-
structed for purposes of the interference—against which evidence of priority is as-
sessed.  In some cases, the junior party will provoke an interference by copying the 
claims of the published senior-party patent to ensure complete overlap of the claims.  
In such cases, the count will be the copied claims because of the complete overlap.  
But where the claims are not identical, the PTO must construct the count from the 
coincident portions of the contested claims.  This is quintessentially an exercise in pe-
ripheral-boundary drawing, as the count represents the overlapping coverage of the 
competing patent claims, like the overlapping spaces represented by intersecting cir-
cles in a Venn diagram. 
 It is possible that interference practice could eventually be eliminated by a change 
in American patent law to “first to file” patent granting, but that reform to American 
law has proved elusive and seems unlikely at any time in the near future.  In the in-
terim, a shift back to central claiming might eliminate the relevance of a peripherally 
constructed count.  In the cases where a junior party had copied claims, both parties 
would necessarily have claimed the “heart” or central principles of the invention.  But 
outside of copied claims, the question to be resolved would be whether the later inven-
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the PTO might endeavor to determine how broadly a court might 
eventually construe the claim to be, and to decide whether a claim of 
that breadth would be novel and nonobvious.  Alternatively, the PTO 
might substantially narrow its validity analysis, rejecting an application 
only when the heart of the invention itself tread upon or was obvious 
in view of the prior art. 
Pre-Markman PTO practice carried elements of the first approach; 
while the PTO did not and does not expressly construe patent claims, 
a longstanding rule required it to give a patent claim the “broadest 
reasonable construction” in deciding whether the claim ran afoul of 
the prior art.173  In effect, this was a form of construing the patent 
claim against the drafter and therefore of resolving doubts against 
patentability.  Curiously, however, no similar rule gives patents a 
broad construction during litigation.  Indeed, in cases of ambiguity in 
litigation, courts construe patent claims narrowly rather than 
broadly.174
We are inclined instead toward the second alternative.  In a world 
without a multiplicity of peripheral claims, the right question of pat-
ent validity should in fact be whether the patentee has made some-
thing new.  The fact that the patentee might argue for an overbroad 
scope for that new invention seems to us a reason to narrow the scope 
of the patentee’s right in litigation, not to deprive her of the right to 
the invention altogether. 
This narrowing still leaves a role for the PTO in policing patent 
scope under a central-claiming system.  The PTO would serve a useful 
function by identifying the closest relevant prior art even if that art 
did not invalidate the heart of the patent.  That prior art could be 
used by subsequent courts to cabin the proper scope of the patent. 
Under this approach, central claiming would greatly simplify the 
job of the PTO, but it would do so by giving the office much less op-
portunity to invalidate patents altogether.  That leads us to the second 
tor had first conceived the central characteristics or features of the claimed invention, 
rather than whether the elements of the count were found in an earlier conception.  
Shared central features, rather than intersecting peripheral boundaries, would deter-
mine whether the same invention had been conceived earlier by one inventor than by 
another.
173 See, e.g., In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
174 See Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (holding that, when two constructions are equally likely, courts are to pick the 
narrower one); cf. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194-95 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en 
banc) (holding that the broadest-reasonable-construction rule did not apply to means-
plus-function claims). 
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problem, however.  If patents survive PTO scrutiny because the core 
of the patent is different from what is in the prior art, one foreseeable 
effect is more patent litigation, with more uncertainty as to the out-
come of those suits, since courts will bear a larger burden in defining 
the scope of the patent right for purposes of both validity and in-
fringement.  While we have suggested that this result offers some ad-
vantages—it requires courts to focus on validity and infringement to-
gether and to engage in a real analysis of the scope of the patent 
claims on the basis of what the patentee actually invented rather than 
what the lawyer wrote—there is no doubt that the prospect of not 
knowing what a patent covers until late in the litigation process will be 
a frightening one to many. 
Those skeptical about central claiming, then, might worry that it 
will fail to perform the “public notice” functions of patent claims.175
The ostensible purpose of peripheral claiming includes placing the 
public on notice as to the limits of the patent, warning the public away 
from the claimed technology, and demarcating the boundary between 
infringing and noninfringing activity.  Central claiming does not at-
tempt to explicitly demarcate the boundary between infringing and 
noninfringing activity.  Rather, it leaves the determination regarding 
infringement to adjudication, and so it may offer the public less ad-
vance warning about infringement than peripheral claiming seems to 
offer.  And if the practical effect of this uncertainty is opportunistic 
litigation, either by patent plaintiffs who see an opportunity to reap 
where they have not sown or by patent defendants who hope to avoid 
infringement through minor changes, central claiming might be a 
step backward for patent reform. 
The simple answer to those who worry about the failure of public 
notice under central claiming is that peripheral claiming has already 
failed in that function, and in fact has failed catastrophically.  Recent 
patent cases are filled with examples of infringers who made reason-
able assessments as to what was permissible under a patent’s claims 
and were unpleasantly surprised to discover that sensible readings of 
the claims gave no notice as to what a court would find to be in-
fringement, much less what a party might claim a patent covers.  It 
seems no exaggeration to say that no one reading the average patent 
claim can begin to guess what that claim may be held to cover; that 
can only be known once the claims have been construed by a court in 
a Markman hearing and, realistically, only after the Federal Circuit has 
175 See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 15 (manuscript at 47). 
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reviewed the findings of the district court judge conducting the 
Markman hearing.  The persistent and pervasive character of this fail-
ure suggests that it is not an anomaly that can be repaired but a sys-
temic failure in a system that appears to be irretrievably broken.  And 
it is arguably responsible for the fact that in the industries with the 
most patents, competitors simply don’t read those patents.176
Additionally, public notice is possible under central claiming, if 
perhaps by different means than have become accepted under pe-
ripheral claiming.  We acknowledge that public notice is clearly an 
important feature of patents, but claims are not the only possible way 
to provide that notice.  During the significant period of history in 
which patents did not have claims, the notice function was instead ful-
filled by meeting the requirement that the patentee specify and point 
out what he claimed as his invention—a requirement that today would 
be largely identified with the written-description requirement.177  And, 
indeed, the written-description requirement continues to perform this 
function to some extent under the current regime, even after claims 
have become a recognized and required part of the patent docu-
ment.178  In fact, there are some advantages to obtaining notice from 
the written description rather than the claims, because the focus will 
be on the actual invention and disclosure, not on after-the-fact efforts 
to define what the patentee invented.  And because the focus is on 
that actual invention, central claiming gives its notice much earlier.  
The public can learn what there is to know about the patented inven-
tion when the patent application is filed, not years later when claims 
are actually approved or still later when continuation applications is-
sue.
Because of the historical development of the statute, layering 
claims upon written description, the division of “notice” between 
claims and written description has been rather muddy as a matter of 
patent doctrine.  The two statutory requirements seem somewhat re-
dundant, and this redudancy has led some commentators to question 
176 See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 18, 21 (“[B]oth re-
searchers and companies in component industries simply ignore patents.  Virtually 
everyone does it.”). 
177 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL 
INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §§ 122, 130, 133 (2d ed. 1854). 
178 E.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123 (2006); 
Lefstin, supra note 83.  
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how useful the written-description requirement remains.179  We think 
the inquiry can be turned around:  if the written-description doctrine 
can provide as much notice as claims do, it is open to question 
whether we still need claims.180
The lesson, then, is that notice does not necessarily require a 
bright-line rule; in many instances, standards can provide enough no-
tice.  Indeed, bright-line rules will usually be contorted into standards 
in actual practice.  We have certainly seen that with patent claims.181
Not only is the process of claim construction inherently indetermi-
nate, as we have argued in Part I, but even efforts to create absolute 
rules for particular common terms have failed.  We had a “rule” that 
claims using the phrase “means for doing x” were to be interpreted as 
“means-plus-function” claims governed by special statutory rules of 
construction,182 but over time that rule became a standard—a rebut-
table presumption that use of particular language does or does not in-
voke section 112 ¶ 6.183  And even that rebuttable presumption turns 
out to be extraordinarily difficult to apply; one strains to find any dis-
tinctions at all in reading the Federal Circuit cases that do or do not 
find a claim to be a means-plus-function claim.184  We insist on treating 
the word “comprising” as signifying an open claim and “consisting of” 
as signifying a closed claim—except when we don’t.  Courts have re-
fused to apply those terms as patent law defines them when the results 
179 See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats:  Contending with the “Written De-
scription” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 55, 61 (2000); Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope:  A Report From the Mid-
dle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1649-52 (2007); Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the 
Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 209, 222 (1998). 
180 Cf. Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & IN-
TELL. PROP. 278, 290 (2008) (arguing that the increased enforcement of disclosure 
doctrines is effectively driving patentees away from broad peripheral claims). 
181 See supra note 12. 
182 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
183 York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996).  Similarly, claims that don’t use the term “means” may nonetheless be 
means-plus-function claims.  See, e.g., Welker Bearing v. PhD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1096 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the phrase “mechanism for” presumptively invokes 
means-plus-function claims). 
184 Compare Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (find-
ing that “perforation means . . . for tearing” included structure and so was not a means-
plus-function claim (omission in original)), with Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic 
Prods. Int’l, Ltd., 157 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that “spring 
means tending to keep the door closed” did not disclose structure and so was subject 
to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6), abrogated on other grounds by Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 
Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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seemed absurd.185  Courts read the term “a” to mean “one or more”—
except when they don’t.186  The list goes on. 
We are not arguing against judicial interpretation of patent lan-
guage; as we have pointed out elsewhere, interpretation is a necessary, 
inevitable, and even useful part of the judicial function.187  Indeed, we 
expect some similar disputes over the meaning of the specification, as 
courts already do in deciding how the specification might influence 
the meaning of the claims.188  The problem is, rather, the pretense 
that the language on which the interpretation is based can or does 
concretely define the outer boundary of the patent holder’s rights.  
This is essentially an impossibility because patents describe not a 
physical entity, but a set of legal entitlements.189  Central claiming 
avoids the problem, not by offering greater determinacy, but by avoid-
ing the pretense that such determinacy is possible.  The processes of 
granting and enforcing exclusive rights common to all forms of IP re-
quire some determination as to the boundaries of the property with 
which the rights are associated.  Some interpretive act by an adjudica-
tor is necessarily part of such determinations, whether they are made 
as part of a determination of patent scope in central claiming or as 
part of claim construction in a peripheral-claiming regime.  Central 
claiming sets a muddier standard that courts work out case by case ex 
post; the virtue is that central claiming admits to being muddy instead 
of pretending to be crystalline. 
185 See, e.g., Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(holding that “consisting of” does not signify a closed claim where a defendant added 
a spatula to a dental repair kit “consisting of” certain chemicals). 
186 See, e.g., N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) (holding that “linkage to a terminal portion” of a polysaccharide means linkage 
to one and only one terminal portion); see also KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 
F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the word “a” generally means “one or 
more” in open-ended claims).  Chisum reports no fewer than seventeen Federal Cir-
cuit decisions construing the term “a.”  DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENT LAW DIGEST
§§ 1529–1536 (2007). 
187 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 18, at 104-08. 
188 Compare Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 
1018-19 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (relying on the specification in construing the definition of 
“wound” narrowly), with id. at 1025 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (disputing the meaning of the 
term “wound” as described in the specification). 
189 As the CCPA noted in reviewing a PTO obviousness determination, “it is most 
difficult, if not meaningless, to try to say what is or is not an obvious variation of a 
claim.  A claim is a group of words defining only the boundary of the patent monop-
oly.  It may not describe any physical thing and indeed may encompass physical things 
not yet dreamed of.  How can it be obvious or not obvious to modify a legal bound-
ary?” In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970).  See Lefstin, supra note 83. 
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The answer to the charge of indeterminacy leveled against central 
claiming, then, is guilty.  But peripheral claiming is guilty of indeter-
minacy too; indeed, it may be compounding the felony by falsely 
promising precision that it cannot deliver.  The indeterminacy of pe-
ripheral claiming is not something that can be fixed; it is inherent in 
the disjunction between what is to be described and the language that 
describes it.  And if we can’t have bright-line rules in this case, we 
might be better off striving for accurate standards rather than the mi-
rage of unattainable clarity. 
C.  Half-Steps:  Ending the Hegemony of Markman
Markman has remarkably quickly become the heart of almost every 
patent lawsuit.  Very few patent cases go to trial:  98% either settle or 
are decided on summary judgment.190  And both settlement and sum-
mary judgment often depend critically on the outcome of claim con-
struction.191  Peripheral claiming is even more firmly established; 
Judge Rich, the author of the 1952 Patent Act, summed up its impor-
tance by saying “the name of the game is the claim.”192  Eliminating 
Markman and peripheral claiming would accordingly be a radical 
change, one that would surely create temporary panic in the patent 
bar and that might have consequences that are hard to foresee.  We 
are also mindful of the industry-specific character of patent claims, 
which complicates the comparison of the costs and benefits of periph-
eral claiming.  With that in mind, we offer in this Section some alter-
natives to a pure central-claiming system that might nonetheless im-
prove on the flawed system of peripheral claims. 
First, even if peripheral claims are not required, the law might 
make them optional.  Even before patent claims were required in the 
nineteenth century, patentees sometimes provided those claims in an 
190 According to a search conducted February 24, 2009, via Stanford IP Litigation 
Clearinghouse, http://lexmachina.stanford.edu, 446 of the 24,307 patent cases filed 
between 2008 and February 2009, or 1.8%, went to jury verdict.  This number likely 
understates the number of cases that went to trial, both because the denominator in-
cludes pending cases that might go to trial and because some patent cases, such as 
pharmaceutical suits against generics, go to bench trial instead.  But this number is 
likely in the right range. 
191 See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 17, at 958 (noting that Markman drives 
summary judgments); Lemley & Walker, supra note 75 (investigating the relationship 
between Markman and settlement). 
192 Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American Per-
spectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990). 
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effort to delineate what they thought they had invented.193  As we have 
seen, relying on claim language to define the boundaries of an inven-
tion often fails.  But as we have written elsewhere, different industries 
experience the patent system very differently,194 and there may be in-
dustries or technologies for which claims are quite clear expressions 
of patent scope.  A DNA sequence, for instance, tells someone who is 
skilled in that art what is included and what is not; so too might a 
definition of a chemical genus.195  If claims work for those inventions, 
there is no reason that patentees shouldn’t be able to use them.  A 
patentee who set out voluntary claims would, in effect, be precommit-
ting to a certain claimed patent scope, allowing examiners to evaluate 
the prior art in view of the scope of the claimed patent and giving the 
public and the courts notice of what the patentee considered her own.  
But unlike modern mandatory, peripheral claiming, the voluntary 
claim would not be an all-or-nothing proposition.  A patentee who 
overclaimed could not get broad protection without invalidating the 
claim but could reasonably fall back on the narrower gist of the inven-
tion.  Similarly, a patentee who made a mistake in claim language 
would not be doomed by that mistake in the way it is today. 
Second, even in a peripheral-claiming system, courts could pay 
more attention than they do to the patentee’s actual invention and 
the incremental contribution that it makes compared to the prior art.  
Phillips was a step in the right direction here, emphasizing the patent 
specification over dictionaries as a source of meaning for ambiguous 
claim terms.196  Dictionaries are one further step removed than claim 
language from the actual invention; looking at what the patentee ac-
tually said and did, in understanding patent claims, will help refocus 
patent analysis on inventions and not linguistic games.  But more re-
mains to be done.  Courts should think expressly about the impor-
tance of an invention in defining its scope, either literally or through 
the doctrine of equivalents.  The now-moribund “pioneering patents” 
193 See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text. 
194 Compare BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 18 (manuscript at 142-55), with BURK &
LEMLEY, supra note 18 (manuscript at 156-65). 
195 A particular type of patent claim, called a “Markush” claim, specifies compo-
nents that can be combined.  It takes the form X + Y + Z where X is selected from the 
group A, B, C; Y is selected from the group D, E, F; and Z is selected from the group G,
H, I. See ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 50 
(4th ed. 1996). Markush claims uniquely define a group by identifying all its members. 
196 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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doctrine could serve this purpose.197  Courts should be willing in ap-
propriate cases to disregard claim language that doesn’t seem to accu-
rately capture what the patentee invented, rather than being prisoners 
to that language even when it subverts the intent of the patent.  Even 
within a peripheral claiming system, the boundaries can be defined 
with more or less precision, and courts should be willing to look to the 
purpose of the invention and what distinguishes it from the prior art 
to avoid giving words a meaning that subverts the true nature of the 
patentee’s invention. 
Finally, even if we are to define peripheral claims and construe 
them in Markman hearings, courts need not construe every term in a 
claim, or even every term about which the parties might disagree.  A 
surprisingly large number of claim-construction disputes turn out to 
be unnecessary, in the sense that choosing one construction or an-
other will not resolve the case.  Other claim constructions are unlikely 
to help a judge or jury understand the patent claim because they take 
simple English words and replace them with more simple English 
197 The Wright brothers, for example, won their patent-infringement suit against 
Glenn Curtiss in 1914 because they were pioneering inventors, and the court accord-
ingly afforded them broad protection even against the somewhat different Curtiss 
plane.  Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 211 F. 654, 655 (2d Cir. 1914).  The Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, the predecessor to the Federal Circuit, applied the pio-
neer-patent doctrine, see Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400 (C.C.P.A. 
1967), and the Supreme Court continues to talk about patent scope under the doc-
trine of equivalents as a function of how pioneering the patent is.  See Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 n.4 (1997).  To some extent 
broadened claim scope follows naturally from the situation of a pioneering patent:  
there is little prior art in a newly opened field that would prevent the inventor from 
claiming broadly.  Broad literal claims may not anticipate later-invented technologies 
that could be substituted for elements of the claim, however; such substitutions may 
instead be captured under the doctrine of equivalents, if applied broadly.   
 The pioneer-patent rule has not been invoked by the Federal Circuit in recent 
years, leading some to consider it moribund.  Compare Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar 
Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that “pioneering inventions 
deserve a broader range of equivalents”), with Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, 
Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that “the ‘pioneer’ is not a separate 
class of invention”), overruled on other grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides 
Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  The Federal Circuit did endorse the 
pioneering-patent doctrine in an unpublished opinion in 2003.  See Molten Metal 
Equip. Innovations, Inc. v. Metaullics Sys. Co., 56 F. App’x 475, 480 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
And the doctrine provides at least one factor to consider in deciding how broadly to 
apply the doctrine of equivalents.  Some scholars have argued that it should play a 
greater role in doctrine-of-equivalents cases than it does today.  See, e.g., Michael J. 
Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement, and Patent Claim Scope:  A New Perspec-
tive on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 2002-05 (2005); Thomas, supra note 
13, at 58-59. 
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words.  Someone may have to decide what “about 6.0” means, but 
there is little reason to think that defining the term “about” with other 
words will advance that cause.  Further, even some case-dispositive 
constructions are case-dispositive not because they really resolve a le-
gitimate question about the scope of a patent but because they focus 
on a drafting error to cabin the patent in ways that the inventor did 
not intend,198 or on a deliberate ambiguity to broaden the patent to 
cover things the patentee did not invent.199  In those cases, claim con-
struction serves as a trap for the unwary plaintiff or defendant, not as 
a genuine effort to figure out what the patentee can rightfully claim to 
have invented. 
To solve this problem, we propose that claim construction be lim-
ited to terms that are (1) technical, and (2) the point of novelty.  The 
nominal purpose of claim construction is to help the jury understand 
what the patent covers so that it can evaluate validity and infringe-
ment.  It makes sense to explain to the jury the meaning of technical 
terms—no jury can figure out whether the accused product contains 
“1,2-dichloroethylene” unless they know what that is.200  It doesn’t 
make sense to explain to the jury what “when” means; claim construc-
tion here is being used not to clarify but to shape the meaning of the 
patent claims and, hence, the scope of the invention.  And if we are to 
do that, we should be doing it only at the point of novelty.  It may mat-
ter whether the inventor of a piston-pumped water gun claims to own 
all air-pressure water guns or only those in which pressure is produced 
by a piston; it should not matter where the water is located in the gun, 
because that is not relevant to what the patentee actually invented.201
“Point of novelty” as a concept has a bad reputation in patent law,202
but that’s because the Federal Circuit fears that it will be used to treat 
inventions as obvious on the basis of prior art that does not in fact 
198 See supra note 168. 
199 See supra note 169 (giving examples). 
200 Nasty stuff.  See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH GUIDELINE FOR 1,2-DICHLOROETHYLENE,
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/healthguidelines/1_2-dichloroethylene/recognition.html 
(last visited April 15, 2009). 
201 These are, approximately, the facts of Larami Corp. v. Amron, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1280 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1993). 
202 See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (rejecting a gist- or heart-of-the-invention concept in patent law).  By contrast, 
the test was routine in design-patent law until last year.  See, e.g., Egyptian Goddess, Inc. 
v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (rejecting the test). 
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suggest the invention to the PHOSITA.203  Courts should protect pat-
ent owners by focusing claim construction on what the patentee did 
that is new, rather than using the need to describe old elements 
somehow as a way to trip them up.204  Claim construction, in short, 
should be a last resort when the parties cannot agree on what the pat-
entee invented, not routine and central to every piece of every patent 
case.
CONCLUSION
Patent law is bogged down in the minutiae of claim construction, 
largely because of the problems attending peripheral claims—that is, 
claims that purport to set the outermost boundaries of patent rights.  
Not only is the cost of such boundary setting becoming prohibitive, 
the goal itself is illusory.  Rather than relying on the illusion of pe-
ripheral “fence posts,” patent law may do better to once again look to 
stability of central “sign posts.”  Improvement could be made by 
adopting hybrid measures, either in the process of moving from fence-
posting to sign-posting or as improvements over the current system 
that still stop short of fully adopting central claiming. 
203 See, e.g., W.L. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1548. 
204 We acknowledge that not every invention will have a “point of novelty” as such; 
for many inventions, the novel feature is a unique combination of known elements.  
But the fact that the point of novelty limitation won’t always work to cabin unnecessary 
claim construction doesn’t mean it can’t be helpful in particular cases. 
